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Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
 
Nigel Arnell, Emma Tompkins, Neil Adger and Kate Delaney 
 
Section 1    Overview of project work and outcomes 
 
Abstract 
 
The most recent assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
projected an increase in global average temperature of between 1.4 and 5.8
oC over the period 
1990 to 2100, a rate of increase without precedent over at least the last 10,000 years. 
However, there is mounting evidence that climate, at least regionally, has changed much 
more rapidly in the past, and there are suspicions that human-induced global warming could 
trigger rapid and abrupt climate changes in the future. The aim of this project was to explore 
the implications of rapid or abrupt climate changes – defined here to be either a step change 
in climate regime or a rate of change outside the IPCC range – for Europe. 
 
There has been a great deal of research into the potential mechanisms of abrupt climate 
change, but there are no published quantitative scenarios. Three characterisations of abrupt 
climate change were therefore produced for the current study. The first describes the potential 
climatic implications of a collapse of the thermohaline circulation in the North Atlantic, 
resulting in cooling across Europe. The second represents an accelerated climate change, 
caused by the additional release of greenhouse gases from permafrost and the oceans as 
climate warms. The final characterisation describes the rapid rise in sea level that would 
result from disintegration of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet. 
 
Managers adapting to gradual climate change accept that change is happening, and look for 
information on the magnitude of change. Managers concerned about abrupt climate change, 
however, are less interested in the magnitude of change – they believe it will by definition be 
extreme – but are more interested in the likelihood of abrupt change occurring. There are, 
however, no scientifically robust estimates of the likelihood of thermohaline circulation 
collapse, accelerated climate change or rapid sea level rise, so a survey of expert opinion was 
conducted to provide some estimates. Difficulties in identifying a large sample of appropriate 
experts, and unwillingness of some experts to make subjective estimates of risk, meant that 
the final sample sizes were small. Estimates of the likelihood of thermohaline circulation 
collapse or accelerated climate change varied significantly between experts, over several 
orders of magnitude: most experts believed the risk of either to be very low (well under 1%), 
but a minority assessed the risk as considerably greater. 
 
A detailed literature review revealed that there have been no published assessments of the 
implications of future abrupt climate change across Europe (a few palaeoclimatic studies 
have examined past physical responses to abrupt changes, and a small number of studies have 
explored how civilisations or communities were affected by past anomalies). An initial 
assessment of the implications of the three characterisations of abrupt climate change was 
therefore made using a combination of model simulations (for hydrology, crop potential and 
energy demand), review of published studies of the effects of gradual climate change and 
change thresholds, and expert judgement. 
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The key impacts of both thermohaline circulation collapse and accelerated climate change are 
likely to be on agriculture and crop production (and hence crop prices and rural economies), 
mortality and ill health, the ability of physical infrastructure (buildings and networks) to 
continue to operate effectively, and on ecosystems in both northern and southern Eirope. 
Accelerated climate change is also likely to significantly affect the availability of water 
resources as demand increases and supplies reduce. Rapid sea level rise would threaten 
coastal infrastructure and large parts of many key European cities, and would increase coastal 
flood losses: this would challenge the viability of insurance against flood hazards, and require 
very large investment in flood defences. All three abrupt changes would see a change in the 
economic and cultural centre of gravity of Europe, in different directions: following 
thermohaline circulation collapse the shift would be southwards, following accelerated 
change it would be northwards, and it would be inland after rapid sea level rise. 
 
Abrupt climate change challenges the conventional scenario-driven approach to adaptation in 
two ways. First, it increases substantially the potential range of climate change impacts to be 
considered, but the likelihood of these extreme impacts occurring is highly uncertain and 
probably very low: unfortunately, it is currently impossible to estimate the likelihood of 
abrupt climate change. Second, it may be  technically or financially difficult to adapt to 
abrupt change. It is, however, possible that in the face of a recognised abrupt climate change 
many of the barriers to adaptation, imposed by public attitudes or government policies, would 
be reduced. 
 
A second approach to adaptation assumes that reducing vulnerability to current climatic 
variability will make a major contribution to reducing vulnerability to future climate change. 
Whilst some measures to reduce current vulnerability (such as poverty alleviation, hazard 
warning and some aspects of land use planning) do also cope with future climatic variability, 
many others do not. These include measures which are designed to provide some defined 
standard of services, such as degree of protection against flooding. Abrupt climate change, by 
definition, involves a step change in climate, and standards-based measures designed to cope 
with current variability are therefore even less likely to be a reasonable response to abrupt 
change. 
 
Given the uncertainty associated with abrupt climate change, and the potential major 
difficulties in actually adapting to change, the most effective adaptation action now is to 
monitor – in the oceans, atmosphere and ice sheets - for the onset of abrupt change. Despite 
the impression given in The Day After Tomorrow, an abrupt climate change would probably 
become clear over a decade – although definitive identification of change would likely be 
highly controversial. 
 
This project has begun to explore the implications of abrupt climate change in Europe, and 
provides the foundation for more in-depth studies. In particular, it is recommended that 
further studies seek to quantify the likelihood of defined abrupt changes in climate (this is 
already under way for some abrupt changes), and that quantitative scenarios for abrupt 
changes are constructed as the basis for quantitative assessments of the potential impacts of 
abrupt change. Research is also needed into the levels of likelihood that would be sufficient 
to trigger adaptive reactions, perhaps building on analogies from other areas exposed to low-
probability, high-impact events. 
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Objectives 
 
The broad aim of this project was to assess the vulnerability of key sectors in Europe to rapid 
or abrupt climate change, using a combination of desk studies and surveys of expert opinion. 
The specific objectives were: 
 
i.  to characterise and define rapid climate changes which may affect Europe, and collate 
state-of-the-art assessments of their likelihood and climatic manifestation 
ii.  to undertake a qualitative assessment of the sectors of the economy and society in 
Europe likely to be affected by the defined rapid climate changes; 
iii.  to construct numerical indicators of vulnerability to defined rapid climate changes, 
across Europe and the UK; 
iv.  to assess the attitudes of managers in different sectors to the threat of extreme, but 
rare, challenges, and begin to construct a conceptual model of adaptation to such 
challenges; 
v.  to provide the basis for a quantitative assessment of the risk of rapid climate change 
impacts, combining vulnerability and likelihood. 
 
Results 
 
There have been no formal studies of the implications of abrupt climate change in Europe, or 
indeed anywhere else, even though there has been much research into the mechanisms of 
abrupt change. Descriptions of three abrupt climate changes - a rapid cooling due to the 
collapse of the thermohaline circulation in the North Atlantic, a rapid warming due to the 
accelerated release of additional greenhouse gases as climate warms, and a rapid sea level 
rise following collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet – were developed as a basis for an 
expert assessment. Discussions with those who may need to adapt to abrupt climate change 
revealed that they were more concerned about the likelihood of it occuring than its 
magnitude: a survey of experts showed a considerable range in estimates of likelihoods. 
Impacts of abrupt climate change on Europe are likely to be severe, but cannot yet be 
quantified. Major implications include significant changes to agriculture, and hence crop 
prices and the rural economy, and significant impacts on infrastructure reliability, under both 
cooling and accelerated warming. Rapid sea level rise would increase substantially coastal 
flood risk and permanently inundate some major cities and infrastructure. In each case, the 
economic centre of gravity of Europe is likely to change. It is not feasible to begin to adapt 
now to abrupt climate change, and it reducing vulnerability to current climatic variability or 
even gradual climate change would not be sufficient to adapt to abrupt climate change, but it 
is necessary to monitor for the signs of abrupt change. 
 
 
Relevance to Tyndall Centre research strategy and overall Centre objectives  
 
The project conforms closely to the objectives of the Tyndall Centre, and particularly Theme 
3 on Adaptation to Climate Change. Specifically, it contributes towards the first three 
questions in Theme 3: 
 
1.  Who adapts, to what do they adapt, and why should they adapt? 
2.  What influences the ability of institutions to adapt to climate change? 
3.  Are there critical thresholds beyond which it is difficult to adapt 
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Potential for further work 
 
Key areas for future research include: 
 
•  Quantitative characterisation of abrupt changes in climate: scenarios that can be used 
to drive quantitative impacts models need to be constructed using current 
ocean/climate models. In particular, scenarios combining thermohaline circulation 
collapse with an increasing concentration of greenhouse gases need to be constructed, 
and model simulations of accelerated climate change are required. The 
characterisations used in this preliminary assessment were necessarily based on rather 
naïve assumptions. 
•  Quantitative characterisations of the likelihood of defined abrupt changes in climate, 
under different assumed rates of climate change. This is extremely important, and will 
involve not only model simulations but also assessment of expert opinion (a major in-
depth survey is currently being conducted by the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact 
Research). 
•  Quantitative assessments of the implications of abrupt climate changes for defined 
sectors and regions: the only model-based assessments so far conducted were done for 
the current study and concentrated on physical impacts. In principle this is a relatively 
straightforward task, given scenarios for abrupt climate change and models of 
impacted sectors.  
•  Identification of “dangerous” magnitudes of climate change which would pose 
significant challenges to adaptation: in other words, what are the limits to adaptation? 
•  What are the specific implications of abrupt climate change for adaptation planning in 
particular sectors? Is it possible to draw analogies from other areas exposed to low-
probability, high-impact events, such as military scenario planning or nuclear power 
station design. 
•  What probability of abrupt climate change would alter adaptation planning, and what 
factors influence this threshold probability?  
 
 
Communication highlights  
 
One paper has been submitted to a journal, based on a presentation at the conference on 
“Perspectives on Dangerous Climate Change” held at UEA in June 2004: 
 
Arnell, N.W., Tompkins, E.L. & Adger, W.N. (2005) Eliciting information on the likelihood 
of rapid climate change. Submitted to Risk Analysis 
 
A paper on the potential impacts of rapid climate change is being prepared for publication: 
 
Arnell, N.W., Delaney, E.K., Tompkins, E. & Adger, N. Implications of abrupt climate 
change for Europe: an initial assessment. To be submitted to Climatic Change. Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
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Section 2:   Technical Report 
 
1.  Introduction and aims 
 
The most recent assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
projected an increase in global average temperature of between 1.4 and 5.8
oC over the period 
1990 to 2100, a rate of increase without precedent over at least the last 10,000 years (IPCC, 
2001a). Many studies – reviewed by the IPCC (2001b) - have assessed the ecological, 
economic and social impacts of such increases in temperature, in both qualitative and 
quantitative terms. All such studies, however, have essentially assumed that climate changes 
gradually (albeit at an historically fast rate under the most extreme projections) and 
“smoothly”. Very few studies have reviewed comprehensively or quantitatively the potential 
effects of rapid or abrupt climate changes – broadly defined here as a “step change” in 
climate regime or a rate of change outside the IPCC range – although there has been much 
more research into the potential processes by which rapid or abrupt climate change might 
occur (National Research Council, 2002; Alley et al., 2003).  However, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that some key sectors are very concerned about rapid climate change – and about the 
likelihood and impact of unprecedented extreme events - particularly where large and long-
lived infrastructure investments are involved, and since late 2003 interest in the threat of 
rapid or abrupt climate change has increased substantially. Public awareness in the UK has 
been raised by a BBC Horizon documentary entitled The Big Chill first broadcast in 
November 2003, the leaking of a report commissioned by the US Pentagon (Schwartz & 
Randall, 2003) and, most recently, by the Hollywood movie The Day After Tomorrow, 
released in the UK in May 2004.  
 
The broad aim of this project, which began in April 2003, was to assess the vulnerability of 
key sectors in Europe to rapid or abrupt climate change, using a combination of desk studies 
and surveys of expert opinion. The IPCC’s Third Assessment Report (2001b) states that 
“vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude, and rate of climate variation to which 
a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity” (p995). However, through 
discussions with policymakers who are considering adapting to climate change – across many 
sectors – it became clear that perceptions of vulnerability to rapid or abrupt climate change 
are very much determined by perceptions of likelihood: if it happens it will almost by 
definition be “bad”, so what is important is the chance of it happening. Any assessment of 
vulnerability to and potential adaptation to rapid or abrupt climate change must therefore 
begin with an assessment of the likelihood of defined rapid changes occurring. 
 
This report is structured as follows. The next section explores in detail the interpretation of 
“rapid” or “abrupt” climate change, and introduces a classification. Section 3 introduces 
semi-quantitative characterisations of three abrupt climate changes used as the basis for an 
assessment of impacts and vulnerability, and Section 4 discusses the assessment of 
likelihoods for these characterisations. Section 5 summarises the estimated impacts of abrupt 
climate change in Europe, and Section 6 discusses implications for vulnerability to abrupt 
climate change. Section 7 describes the implications for developing adaptation strategies. 
Section 8 explores the implications of abrupt climate change for adaptation. 
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2.  What is abrupt climate change? 
 
2.1  Abrupt forcings and abrupt impacts 
 
Until recently there have been no clear definitions of “rapid” or “abrupt” changes
1: the 
glossary of the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report, for example, describes some “rapid” 
climate changes, but does not attempt a formal definition. Essentially, these changes are 
implicitly assumed to result in a rate of climate change outside the range (increase of 1.5 to 
5.8
oC in global average temperature and an increase in sea level of 10 to 87cm by 2100, 
relative to 1961-1990) projected in the Third Assessment Report.  A broad distinction can be 
drawn between two types of rapid or abrupt change. The first can be seen as abrupt changes, 
where the climate system either globally or regionally crosses a threshold and switches to a 
new state (National Research Council, 2002): these changes include the collapse of the 
thermohaline circulation and the collapse of ice sheets. The second can be seen as 
accelerated changes, where the rate of climate change increases rapidly: these include 
changes due to large positive feedbacks, such as the release of methane into the atmosphere 
following warming at the sea bed or of permafrost. This accelerated change may result in an 
abrupt change in climate, but will not necessarily do so. There is also a scale issue: “abrupt” 
climate changes are generally implicitly taken to affect large geographic areas. Gradual 
climate change will mean that some localised marginal areas will experience substantial 
changes in climate regime which may locally be perceived as rapid and abrupt. 
 
A distinction can also be drawn between abrupt and rapid climate changes and abrupt climate 
change impacts. The former represent large changes to the forcings applied to a system, 
whilst the latter arise once a key response threshold is crossed (Figure 1). A rapid or abrupt 
climate change need not cause a major impact; an abrupt climate change impact may result 
from a gradual change in climate forcings. An important difference between rapid and abrupt 
climate change forcings and abrupt climate change impacts is that the former can in principle 
be defined objectively, whilst the latter may be subjectively defined. The next two 
subsections explain in more detail rapid and abrupt climate change forcings and abrupt 
climate change impacts. The term “abrupt climate change” is used subsequently to cover 
rapid and abrupt climate change forcings and abrupt climate change impacts. 
 
2.2  Rapid and abrupt forcings 
 
Ecological, social and economic systems are influenced to varying degrees by the state of the 
physical environment. This includes the underlying soil and rock on the one hand and the 
processes operating on this underlying material on the other. Whilst some of these processes 
are geological – such as metamorphosis of rock through heating or uplift through land 
movement – most are driven by weather and climate. These processes may be effectively 
constant (but with variation at different time scales around a mean), may change gradually, or 
may change rapidly and abruptly. An earthquake or volcanic eruption can be seen as a rapid 
change in process, and climate change has the potential to trigger rapid and abrupt changes in 
climate processes and regimes. 
 
                                                 
1 This is partly because of major differences in time scale between different disciplines involved in climate 
change science: a change that is rapid for a geologist may be slow for an ecologist Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
 7  January  2005 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Rapid and abrupt climate change and abrupt climate change impacts 
 
 
Table 1 proposes a classification of potential rapid and abrupt climate changes due to an 
increasing concentration of greenhouse gases. Brief descriptions of each follow.  
 
Abrupt shifts in the thermohaline circulation have been implicated in many abrupt climate 
changes in the past (see Clark et al., 2002 for a review), most significantly during the 
Younger Dryas (12,700 years BP) and 8,200 years BP (known as the 8.2 ka event). The 
thermohaline circulation can be seen as a pump, bringing warm water across the North 
Atlantic towards Europe. The pump is driven by this warm salty water cooling, becoming 
more dense, and then sinking to flow southwards at depth. Large inputs of freshwater into the 
North Atlantic may reduce surface density, prevent further sinking and essentially switch off 
the transport of warm water north eastwards across the Atlantic. Model simulations show that 
temperatures across Europe could fall by up to 3
oC in little more than a decade if the 
transport of warm water were to reduce (Vellinga & Wood, 2002). Inputs of freshwater in the 
past have come from catastrophic releases from ice-dammed lakes in North America during 
deglaciation, and these of course no longer exist. Future freshwater could come from extra 
precipitation over the Arctic Ocean, increased runoff from rivers draining into the Arctic, or 
accelerated melt of the Greenland ice sheet (see below). The likelihood of the collapse of the 
thermohaline circulation during the coming century is very uncertain: it is not clear how close 
the circulation is to a threshold, and it is not clear how much extra freshwater is likely to 
arrive into the North Atlantic. 
 
It is estimated that over the last century precipitation over the Antarctic ice sheet has 
exceeded loss by melt or calving, and model projections are for this to continue during the 
21
st century (Church & Gregory, 2001). However, the West Antarctic Ice Sheet is grounded 
below sea level, and thus potentially unstable: if the ice shelves surrounding the ice sheet are 
weakened by melting from above or below, it is possible that discharge of ice would increase 
substantially. Other mechanisms which may trigger “rapid” deglaciation (over decades or 
centuries) include rapid acceleration of ice streams within the West Antarctic Ice Sheet. 
Complete collapse would raise global sea levels by around 5m, but this is likely to take 
thousands of years: rates of sea level rise during collapse are unlikely to exceed 1 m/century 
(or 10mm per year: Vaughan & Spouge, 2002).  Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
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Table 1:   A classification of rapid and abrupt climate changes Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
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Complete disintegration of the Greenland Ice Sheet would raise sea levels by 7m. This ice 
sheet is much more stable than the West Antarctic Ice Sheet because it is entirely grounded 
above sea level, and under most of the scenarios reviewed in the Third Assessment Report 
melting of the Greenland Ice Sheet would lead to only a small increase in global sea level 
(Church & Gregory, 2001).  However, subsequent research has suggested that the Greenland 
Ice Sheet is less stable than previously suspected, and is likely to be eliminated once 
temperatures rise by more than around 3
oC above 1990 temperatures (Gregory et al., 2004). 
Whilst this is unlikely to have an effect during the 21
st century, over the next 1000 years sea 
level would rise by 7m (and, of course, this freshwater would contribute to weakening of the 
thermohaline circulation).  
 
The climate system is characterised by a large number of feedbacks, both positive and 
negative. Most of these feedbacks are incorporated into climate models and therefore 
influence projections of future climate change. However, many of the feedbacks are not well 
understood or adequately modelled, and there are some additional feedbacks which have the 
potential to produce substantially larger increases in temperature than currently projected. 
The US National Research Council identifies three groups of climate feedback (NRC, 2003). 
The first affect the magnitude of climate change, and are divided into feedbacks which affect 
climate sensitivity (change in climate for a given change in forcing) and feedbacks which 
affect the rate of forcing. Whilst there are many unknowns in the first of these two sub-
groups, and the NRC recommends further research as a high priority, it is not anticipated that 
these feedbacks would result in substantially more rapid rates of climate change than 
currently projected. The second sub-group – affecting rates of forcing - however, have greater 
potential for generating rapid climate change. Higher temperatures may lead to increased 
release of methane from high latitude wetlands, particularly where permafrost thaws, and 
higher temperatures at the sea bed may lead to the release of methane currently stored as 
methane hydrates (Ehhalt & Prather, 2001). Recent research also suggests that higher 
temperatures would increase further the rate at which carbon is released from the soil (Knorr 
et al., 2005). The magnitude of effect is unknown, and potential effects on forcings and hence 
climate have not yet been simulated. 
 
The second group of climate feedbacks identified by the NRC influence the rate of response 
to climate change, and primarily relate to rates of heat uptake in the ocean. Whilst these 
feedbacks are important, they are unlikely to lead to rapid climate change. The third group of 
feedbacks, however, may result in large and abrupt changes in climate at the regional scale. 
These feedbacks include the effect of changes in land surface on climate, and shifts in the 
natural modes of climatic variability. The potential effects of changes in land surface on 
climate (through changes in albedo and evaporation) have been suspected for several 
decades, although it is only in the last few years that model studies have shown substantial 
regional impacts on climate of changes in land cover (e.g. Chase et al., 2000; Pitman & Zhao, 
2000; Higgins et al., 2002)). However, there is considerable uncertainty over the extent of 
change, largely due to uncertainties in the modelling of land surface processes. Also, the 
effects of future land cover change on climate (current generation climate models assume no 
change in land cover) depend on projections of future land cover.  
 
The climate system is characterised by a number of consistent patterns, known as modes of 
climatic variability. The most well-known is the El Nino/Southern Oscillation (ENSO), 
which influences spatial and temporal patterns of temperature and rainfall around the Pacific 
Ocean and into the Indian Ocean: during an ENSO event rainfall is anomalously high in the 
eastern Pacific and low in the west, and the south and east Asian monsoons are weaker. The Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
 10  February  2005 
North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) affects variability in weather across Europe from year to 
year. In years when the pressure gradient across the North Atlantic is high depressions are 
more vigorous, and when the pressure gradient is low depressions are weaker and pass further 
to the south. Some climate models project shifts in modes of variability so that, for example, 
the the climate switches to a “permanent-ENSO” or the pressure gradient across the North 
Atlantic is consistently high (Cubasch & Meehl, 2001). Whilst this may not have large effects 
on indicators of global climate, it may have very rapid and abrupt effects on regional climate. 
A particular concern is that a shift to a more persistent ENSO would lead to reductions in the 
south Asian and east Asian monsoons. However, computer simulations show that increased 
moisture availability would more than offset reduced circulation, and rainfall is projected to 
increase in both the south and east Asian monsoons (May, 2004; Bueh et al., 2003). 
 
Any change in climate has the potential to alter mean climate and the frequency of 
occurrence of extremes. A rapid or abrupt climate change will (by definition) alter mean 
climates substantially, and have large effects on the frequency with which extremes occur. A 
relatively small “non-abrupt” change in climate which has relatively little effect on regional 
mean climate, however, may produce very large changes not only in the frequency of extreme 
events in the region, but also their characteristics. For example, an increase in sea surface 
temperatures has the potential to generate more vigorous tropical cyclones, which may begin 
to affect areas currently not exposed to them (although current model projections suggest 
little change in areas affected by tropical cyclones: Cubasch & Meehl, 2001). The occurrence 
of an unprecedented event – a hurricane, for example, or an exceptionally prolonged drought 
– in an area may trigger significant impacts and major changes in the management of extreme 
events, which may be different in character to the changes that would result from an altered 
frequency of “normal” extreme events. In practice, of course, it may be difficult to 
distinguish an extremely rare but “normal” event from one that is qualitatively different: was, 
for example, the 1703 “hurricane” that affected southern England really just an extreme 
storm, or was it in a class of its own, and were the 2002 floods in central Europe really 
caused by unprecedented combinations of climatic conditions? 
 
 
2.3  Rapid and abrupt impacts 
 
In the most general terms, climate change is likely to have three broad types of impact on an 
ecological, social or economic system. First, a changing climate may have no identifiable 
impact, either because the climate change is small (perhaps relative to other relevant forcings) 
or because the system can adapt to the changing climate with little or no cost or effort. 
Second, a changing climate may require either a more substantial adaptive response or create 
greater impacts if adaptation does not take place, but even so does impose an unduly 
excessive burden. Adaptation is in principle feasible, and the impacts are not intolerable (at 
least at some scales). Third, a changing climate may generate unacceptable impacts or be 
extremely difficult to adapt to: this last category can be termed a “rapid”, “abrupt” or 
“dangerous”
2 climate change impact.  
 
The boundaries between the three types of impact are fuzzy, but broadly can be seen as 
critical thresholds: as thresholds are crossed, climate change impacts move from being trivial, 
through broadly tolerable, to unacceptable. There are two types of threshold. A biophysical 
threshold (a “force threshold”: Arnell, 2000) exists when the system performs differently 
                                                 
2 there is an increasing literature on the interpretation of “dangerous” climate change (Dessai et al., 2004) Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
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when the climate-driven forcing passes a certain point. There are many examples from 
geomorphology and ecology (e.g. for thermal bleaching of corals: Berkelmans, 2002), and 
Kenny et al. (2000) give examples of biophysical thresholds in some sectors in New Zealand 
agriculture.  
 
A “response” threshold (Arnell, 2000) is imposed by the operators or managers of a particular 
system, and may be expressed in terms of standards of service. In this case, transition from 
one impact state to another occurs not because the system is behaving differently, but because 
its performance is outside specified boundaries. These boundaries may be objectively defined 
– they may be based on cost-benefit criteria, for example – but the key point is that they are 
human inventions, and may be entirely subjective. Climate change may be believed to be “too 
rapid”, or impacts to be “unacceptable”.  
 
Whilst rapid and abrupt changes to climate forcings can in principle be identified and 
characterised objectively and scientifically, rapid and abrupt impacts of climate change may 
largely be either subjectively defined or at the very least based on human rules and 
procedures. These types of impacts cannot therefore necessarily be identified “top-down”, but 
must be determined from the bottom-up (Dessai et al., 2004). 
 
 
3.  Characterising abrupt climate changes 
 
3.1  Types of abrupt climate change 
 
Unlike “gradual” climate change, rapid climate changes are most easily visualised as notable 
singular events, such as collapse of the thermohaline circulation or collapse of the West 
Antarctic Ice Sheet, or as the results of step changes in forcing. Discussion of the 
implications of rapid climate change can therefore be based around narrative 
characterisations of potential changes. The Pentagon report (Schwartz & Randall, 2003), for 
example, used the climate changes during the Younger Dryas (12700 years ago) as an 
analogue for the future climatic impacts of a collapse of the thermohaline circulation. This 
section describe the characterisations of three abrupt climate change scenarios developed in 
the current study. Two of the scenarios are based on climate changes simulated under the 
IPCC’s A2 emissions scenario using the HadCM3 climate model (Johns et al., 2003). 
 
3.2  Collapse of the thermohaline circulation 
 
There have so far been no published simulations of the combined effect of climate change 
and thermohaline circulation collapse. The indicative effects of a collapse of the thermohaline 
circulation are therefore here based on combining changes in climate presented by Vellinga 
& Wood (2002) assuming no climate change with simulations made using the same HadCM3 
climate model and the A2 emissions scenario. Scenarios for change in climate by the 2020s 
and 2050s are here constructed by adding the simulated effects of thermohaline circulation 
collapse to the seasonal climates as simulated using the HadCM3 model and the A2 
emissions scenario, assuming thermohaline circulation collapse in 2015 and 2035. 
Specifically, Vellinga & Wood’s changes in climate in the first decade are added to the 
HadCM3 A2 ensemble mean climate change for the 2020s (collapse in 2015) and 2040s 
(collapse in 2035), and changes for the 2050s are estimated by appying the relevant decadal 
change from Vellinga & Wood to the climate at the time of collapse. This is inevitably an 
approximation, for three reasons: first, it is not necessarily the case that the effects of Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
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thermohaline circulation collapse and increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases will be 
additive;  second, the approach does not take into account the continuing increase in 
greenhouse gases after thermohaline circulation collapse, and third, Vellinga & Wood’s 
(2002) simulation involved an instantaneous influx of freshwater rather than a gradual but 
prolonged increase. Also, different climate models would of course give a different spatial 
pattern of change. 
 
Figure 2 shows the change in average annual temperature, winter precipitation and summer 
precipitation across Europe by the 2020s and 2050s, assuming collapse in 2015, and Figure 3 
shows the same assuming collapse in 2035 (note that here the 2020s changes represent just 
the effect of increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases). Figure 4 shows the change in 
annual temperature in England and Wales with climate change as projected in the UKCIP02 
scenarios (Hulme et al., 2002) and assuming collapse of the thermohaline circulation in 2015 
and 2035.  
 
3.3  Accelerated climate change 
 
Accelerated climate change is characterised by rescaling the spatial pattern of change 
simulated by the HadCM3 climate model under the A2 emissions scenario to represent faster 
rates of change. Specifically, it is assumed that accelerated feedbacks would lead to climate 
change twice as fast as that under the A2 emissions scenario, resulting in increases in global 
mean temperature, relative to the 1961-1990 mean, of 2
oC by 2020s, 4.2
oC by 2050s, and 
7.2
oC by 2080s. Figure 5 shows changes in mean annual temperature, together with winter 
and summer precipitation, across Europe by the 2020s and 2050s. It is implicitly assumed 
that the rate of increase in forcing does not affect the spatial pattern of change (on physical 
grounds it could be expected that land would warm up more rapidly than sea). It is also 
important to note that different climate models would give different patterns of change in 
climate. Figure 4 shows the change in average annual temperature across England and Wales 
under the scenario for accelerated climate change, compared to the projections under the 
UKCIP02 scenarios. 
 
3.4  Collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet 
 
Rapid sea level rise is characterised by an increase in sea level of 2.2m by 2100, relative to 
1990 mean, with the increase continuing unabated after 2100. This increase of 20mm per year 
represents the maximum IPCC rate (8.8mm per year) plus a contribution of 10 mm per year 
from the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, plus a bit more to allow for decline of the Greenland Ice 
Sheet.  
 
Figure 6 shows the change in global sea level from the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report 
together with the assumed rapid sea level rise scenario. Sea level rise due to thermal 
expansion varies geographically, but variations would be relatively small if a large proportion 
of the increase was due to ice sheet collapse. Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
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Figure 2:  Change in temperature and precipitation by 2025 and 2050, with thermohaline 
circulation collapse in 2015 and global warming following A2 emissionsVulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
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Figure 3:  Change in temperature and precipitation by 2025 and 2050, with thermohaline 
circulation collapse in 2035 and global warming following A2 emissions Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
 15  February  2005 
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Figure 4:  Change in UK temperature under the UKCIP02 scenarios, together with 
thermohaline circulation collapse in 2015 and 2035, and accelerated climate 
change 
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Figure 5:  Change in temperature and precipitation by 2025 and 2050, under accelerated 
climate change Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
 17  February  2005 
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Figure 6:  Sea level rise under the IPCC and rapid sea level rise scenariosVulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
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4. Estimating  likelihoods  of abrupt climate change
3 
 
4.1  Introduction: the role of likelihoods 
 
The IPCC’s Third Assessment Report (TAR) has been criticised (Reilly et al., 2001; 
Schneider, 2001;2002) for not assigning probability levels to projected rates of climate 
change, and a number of arguments have been put forward as to why probabilities were not 
estimated. These essentially fall into two categories. Firstly, the physical climate system is 
not well enough known to be able to construct objective probability distributions for model 
parameters or responses to a given forcing, and secondly it is inherently impossible to assign 
probabilities to narrative storylines describing possible future emissions scenarios (Grubler & 
Nakicenovic, 2001).  Nevertheless, since the TAR there have been several attempts to 
construct probability distributions for measures such as change in global temperature (Wigley 
& Raper, 2001; Webster et al., 2003) and also to construct probability distributions for 
potential changes in some indicator of impact (e.g. Jones, 2000). There has, however, been 
far less work on assessing the likelihood of rapid or abrupt climate changes – and these 
probabilities are increasingly being demanded by those seeking to mitigate or adapt.  
 
Dessai & Hulme (2004) noted that the extent to which probabilities were useful or not for 
climate policy depends on context, and in particular on the policy question being asked. Most 
of the controversy over the value of probabilities (rather than how to estimate them) in 
climate policy relates to the use of probababilities in making adaptation or mitigation 
decisions. First, it is argued (Lempert & Schlesinger, 2000; Lempert et al., 2004) that where 
uncertainty is “deep” – as in climate change assessments – it is more appropriate to rely on 
robust strategies that can cope with climate change uncertainty than to use a more formal 
risk-based strategy such as designing to a specified probability standard (designing a 
reservoir, for example, so that there was only a 5% chance that in the future it would be 
insufficiently large to maintain yields). Following this argument, it is therefore unnecessary 
and misleading to attempt to assess probabilities of climate change outcomes: efficient and 
effective adaptation does not rely on probabilities. However, whilst some adaptation 
strategies may be robust to any possible future outcome, it will often not be feasible to design 
strategies that can cope with everything: in practice some potential outcomes would be 
screened out as being “too unlikely”.  
 
Second, some approaches to developing adaptation strategies focus on understanding and 
reducing social vulnerability to the impact of change. Again, probabilities – and indeed 
climate scenarios - are believed not to be relevant here because such measures are insensitive 
to the amount of future change. However, in practice again such assessments need to define 
some boundaries on ranges of possible future climates.  
 
4.2 Estimating  likelihoods 
 
All of the potential rapid and abrupt climate changes that have been identified are either 
physically plausible, have occurred in the past or have been simulated with computer 
simulation models. In principle there are three ways of estimating likelihoods of occurrence: 
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through analysis of past records, through computer simulation using multiple drivers and 
process representations, or through expert judgement. 
 
4.2.1  Analysis of past records  
 
The traditional way of estimating the frequency of occurrence of an event is to use 
information on its occurrence in the past. However, it is very difficult to apply this approach 
to estimate the likelihood of future rapid changes, either because analogue events have not 
occurred in the past or, more problematically, when they did occur the climatic and 
environmental conditions were very different.  
 
For example, there is considerable evidence that the thermohaline circulation in the North 
Atlantic has switched off on several occasions over the last few hundred thousand years 
(Rahmstorf, 2002). In each case, however, shutdowns have been triggered by the release of 
water from very large ice-dammed lakes in North America: these lakes no longer exist. 
 
4.2.2  Computer simulation  
 
The second approach is to use computer simulation models to construct probability 
distributions of defined events from large numbers of simulations making different 
assumptions about, for example, rates of change in driving forces, model formulations and 
parameter values. Several studies have sought to construct probability distributions of future 
global temperature change with this approach, using either simplified climate models run 
several hundreds of times (e.g. Wigley & Raper, 2001; Webster et al., 2003) or smaller 
ensembles of more complicated climate models (e.g. Raisanen & Palmer, 2001; Knutti et al., 
2003; Murphy et al., 2004). Wigley & Raper (2001) and Webster et al. (2003) estimated the 
90% confidence interval for change in global mean temperature by 2100 at 1.7-4.9
oC and 1-
4.9
oC respectively, using slightly different approaches. Raisanen & Palmer (2001) used an 
ensemble of seventeen different climate models to estimate that the probability of a global 
temperature increase greater than 1
oC was 14% after forty years of increasing greenhouse gas 
concentrations, and 82% after eighty years.  Murphy et al. (2004) used a 53-member 
ensemble of different versions of the HadAM3 climate model to estimate, amongst other 
things, a 5-95% confidence interval of  2.4 to 5.4
oC for the equilibrium effect of a doubling of 
CO2 concentrations.  
 
Whilst several studies have sought to identify critical thresholds for the collapse of the 
thermohaline circulation in the North Atlantic (e.g. Rahmstorf & Ganopowlski, 1999), no 
published studies have so far attempted to estimate the likelihood of collapse. Schaeffer et al. 
(2002) ran ten member ensemble simulations under different emissions scenarios to estimate 
the likelihood of abrupt regional cooling due to disruption of ocean circulations patterns in 
part of the Arctic Ocean, showing a virtually 100% likelihood by the end of the 21
st century 
under high emissions, a 33% chance under moderate emissions, and a 10% chance under 
stabilised emissions (they noted that the regional disruptions to ocean circulation did not 
necessarily affect the North Atlantic). Gregory et al. (2004) estimated the likelihood that the 
Greenland Ice Sheet would go into terminal decline, using an ensemble of different climate 
models run with different emissions scenarios.  
 
Estimates of likelihood based on computer simulation models, however, are only as robust as 
the simulation model itself  and the assumed probability distributions of input drivers. 
Weaver & Hillaire-Marcel (2004), for example, emphasise how different types of ocean-Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
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climate model imply different sensitivities of the ocean circulation in the North Atlantic to 
perturbation. Distributions of some input drivers, such as key model parameters, can be based 
on calibrations with observed experience, but there may often be either no or conflicting 
empirical evidence on which to construct probability distributions: in these cases, some form 
of expert judgement is necessary. 
 
4.2.3  By expert judgement  
 
In one sense, all “scientific” assessments are based on some form of expert judgement: the 
judgement of the individual or group responsible for collating “relevant” past experience or 
constructing “accurate and reliable” simulation models. However, a third approach to 
estimating the likelihood of rapid or abrupt climate change is to elicit formally the opinions 
of a number of experts. Formal approaches to use expert opinion have been used for many 
years in many areas of decision making (see Ayuub, 2000 and Morgan & Henrion, 1990). 
Formalised procedures are essential to ensure reliability and credibility (Cooke & Goossens, 
2004), and these may involve two stages. 
 
The first is the elicitation of information from a group of identified experts. Cooke & 
Goossens (2004) suggest that the selection criteria for experts include reputation, experience 
and published track record in the field of interest, diversity of background, balance of views 
and, of course, interest and availability. Information can be elicited using a variety of 
methods, ranging from unstructured in-depth interviews through focus groups to the use of 
structured questionnaires. One variant is the Delphi approach, which essentially involves 
iteration around the group of experts, giving individuals the opportunity to revise their 
estimates or comment on the estimates of others. Acknowledged pitfalls of expert elicitation 
include different interpretations of the questions posed and a widely-reported observation that 
experts tend to be overconfident in their assessments (Morgan et al., 2001). 
 
A second stage involves the aggregation of the information elicited from the experts to 
produce a consensus (Cooke & Goossens (2004) state that the goal of formal expert 
elicitation methods “is to achieve rational consensus in the resulting assessments” (p644)). 
This aggregation could produce, for example, a probability distribution of the magnitude of 
some state parameter reflecting different possible futures or various sources of uncertainty 
(Keith, 1996). There are several ways of constructing aggregated expert assessments (see 
Cooke & Goossens, 2004), all based on different ways of weighting the views of individual 
experts.  
 
Surveys of expert judgement do not necessarily need to aggregate information from 
individual experts. Whilst in some cases it may be appropriate to aggregate in order to 
construct a single probability distribution, in many others the range of expert opinion may be 
much more important (Keith, 1996): information on the diversity of opinion may be 
extremely valuable to policy-makers. Lempert et al. (2004) claim that the attempt to construct 
consensus probability distributions for key climate parameters is fundamentally flawed, due 
to the deep uncertainty over many of the drivers and proceses of global change. 
 
Expert elicitation has been used in a number of climate change assessments. Morgan & Keith 
(1995) interviewed sixteen experts to assess possible future changes in temperature and 
precipitation: each expert gave a “best estimate” and a range, and these were represented 
individually without aggregation. Morgan et al. (2001) surveyed eleven ecologists to obtain 
individual qualitative and quantitative estimates of the impact of climate change on Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
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minimally-disturbed forest ecosystems, finding a greater diversity of opinion than apparent in 
consensus summaries, such as those of the IPCC. Again, the results were not aggregated. 
Vaughan & Spouge (2002) conducted a more formal Delphi survey of the likelihood of rapid 
sea level rise following collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, and aggregated individual 
expert assessments to produce a single probability distribution function describing likelihood 
of collapse. Murphy et al. (2004) based the upper and lower limits for the changing 
parameters of their climate model on expert opinion, although did not use a formal elicitation 
approach. Mastrandrea & Schneider (2004) and Webster et al. (2003), however, used formal 
expert elicitation processes to, respectively, construct probability distributions of climate 
sensitivity and estimate the likelihood of different rates of future emissions of greenhouse 
gases. These two studies both used aggregate constructions from the individual experts. 
 
 
4.3 Assessing  likelihoods:  results 
 
4.3.1 The  approach 
 
An expert survey approach was adopted in the current study to assess the likelihood of 
thermohaline circulation collapse and accelerated climate change (Vaughan & Spouge’s 
(2002) results were used to characterise the likelihood of rapid sea level rise). The approach 
involved the identification of relevant experts and the circulation via email of a standardised 
questionnaire for each of the two abrupt climate changes. The survey involved two iterations: 
the second iteration presented the results and sought both revisions to original estimates and 
comments on the estimates. No attempt was made to aggregate the individual expert 
assessments to produce consensus probability distributions: from the comments of the experts 
(below) it is very unlikely that a consensus could in any case have been reached.  
 
4.3.2 Identifying  experts 
 
Central to any survey of expert opinion is the definition of the experts to be surveyed. 
“Experts” on rapid and abrupt climate change can fall into several different categories: 
 
•  Scientists actively studying the physical processes of rapid and abrupt climate change 
•  Scientists reviewing the work of other scientists (through the IPCC, for example) 
•  Scientists involved in assessing the implications of rapid and abrupt climate change 
scenarios 
•  Policymakers concerned about the implications of rapid and abrupt climate change for 
adaptation or mitigation policies 
•  Lobbyists 
 
Any of these may have opinions on the likelihood of rapid and abrupt climate change, but the 
basis for these opinions and agendas will be different. In order to reduce potential bias the 
decision was made to restrict the survey to scientists involved in studying physical processes 
and reviewing abrupt change science. Experts identified included those who lead major 
research programmes into rapid and abrupt climate change, those who had published on the 
processes of change, and those who had participated in the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report 
reviews of rapid and abrupt change. A total of 21 experts on thermohaline circulation 
collapse was identified, together with 17 experts on accelerated climate change. Experts were 
based in the UK, Europe and the United States. Some of the experts were common to both 
changes. Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
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One of the surveyed experts declined to take part in the survey precisely because he declined 
to identify himself as an expert: 
 
“I doubt if there are more than 5 or 6 people in the UK
4…who could express an independent expert view 
on this. The rest would all be second hand (and hence distort the statistics) or, worse, second hand plus a 
bit of their own subjective biases. Unless you limit your canvassing to the handful of hands-on experts, 
your result could be misleading…” 
 
4.3.3 Participation  rates 
 
The actual response rate to the two surveys was low – thirteen and nine for the thermohaline 
and accelerated surveys respectively, despite reminders. Four of the thermohaline survey 
respondents declined to participate, as did five of the accelerated change survey: their reasons 
are summarised in Table 2. Two declined because of conceptual problems with the allocation 
of subjective probabilities, and two preferred the use of output from simulation models: one 
declined because the likelihood of change was believed to be very small. Six of the nine 
thermohaline circulation survey respondents participated in the second round, as did four of 
the five accelerated change survey respondents. 
 
 
Table 2:  Reasons for declining to participate 
Collapse of thermohaline circulation 
•  I don't consider abrupt cooling of Europe due to a collapse of the thermohaline circulation 
during the next century to be a serious risk 
•  I don't believe that any statement I make without reference to models would be more than a 
guess, with no reliable information content, whereas if I refer to models you should get the 
same, more accurately, by analysing their output yourself. 
•  The approach adopted is not sufficiently sophisticated and the results are therefore potentially 
misleading 
•  I’m not an expert 
Accelerated climate change 
•  I participated in an earlier assessment. On reflection I found the process unsatisfactory and 
therefore decline to take part in another. 
•  I believe there are serious drawbacks to expert elicitations and the subsequent use of their 
subjective probability distributions. 
•  Why you can't obtain results from modelling groups worldwide and do some sort of 
probabilistic analysis of the likelihood of suitably-defined abrupt changes? In any case, I don't 
really think there is much usefulinformation I can give to such a survey. 
•  I find it difficult to answer and therefore will abstain 
•  I’m not an expert 
 
 
4.3.4  Likelihood of thermohaline circulation collapse 
 
Table 3 summarises the expert assessments of the likelihood of thermohaline circulation 
collapse by three dates: 2020, 2050 and 2100. There are clear orders of magnitude difference 
between the eight experts who provided an assessment, although with one exception 
estimated likelihoods are very low (and, with this exception, considerably lower than the 
subjective assessment of 50% quoted in the BBC’s Horizon programme The Big Chill). Each 
respondent based assessments not directly on model simulations, but on a combination of 
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analysis of model output with general knowledge of the ocean/climate system: one based the 
assessment partially on interpretation of recent ocean behaviour. Three experts explicitly 
stated that they believed that current models underestimated the sensitivity to collapse and 
hence likelihood of change. The expert with the highly anomalous assessment was 
particularly sceptical about the ability of climate models to simulate perturbations (“…GCMs 
are probably unrealistically well-behaved…”). Three of the experts stated that it should be 
possible within “a few years” to attempt to estimate likelihoods using either individual 
climate/ocean models or ensembles of models. Three of the respondents provided estimates 
of likelihood for different rates of change, but six could not: one explicitly stated that the 
uncertainty was too high to allow the first estimate to be broken down further. In contrast, 
one of the second round respondents expressed surprise that estimates were independent of 
emissions scenario. 
 
Table 3:  Expert estimates of the likelihood (%) of collapse of the thermohaline 
circulation  
Collapse by..  THC1  THC8  THC9  THC11  THC17  THC18
* THC20 THC6  THC15 
2020  1 10  0.1  0  1  0.05-0.2  1  0  very  low 
2050  15 30  1  0  10 0.5-7  2  0  low 
2100  30 75  10  5  25  5-40  5  possible  possible 
*  varies with emisssions scenario   
 
None of the seven respondents who participated in the second round changed their estimates. 
One commented that some of the reasons given for refusal to participation showed an over-
reliance on the potential use of climate models, and another noted that the some of the 
comments in Table 2 suggested that modellers were being a “little coy” in the interpretation 
of their models. One was surprised at the high probabilities estimated by some respondents – 
but “would need to know who these experts are to assess whether to believe these estimates”. 
One respondent expressed increased skepticism over the approach and hence the reliability of 
any conclusions, and another was surprised by the low response rate (“I do not consider 
myself an expert in this field to the extent as to justify being one of only nine experts 
worldwide to play a role in this assessment”).  
 
 
4.3.5  Likelihood of accelerated climate change 
 
Expert assessments of the likelihood of climate change exceeding different high rates of 
change per decade are summarised in Table 4. Note that the top of the IPCC TAR range is 
approximately 0.5
oC/decade: Wigley & Raper (2001) estimated that the likelihood of change 
by 2100 greater than 5.8
oC (approximately 0.53
oC/decade) was 0.6%, and Webster et al. 
(2003) estimated a 2.5% chance that the increase would be greater than 4.9
oC 
(0.45
oC/decade). Again, there is a considerable range of assessments, with one particularly 
anomalous assessment. A range of methods were used to construct these likelihoods. Two 
experts used directly model simulations. A third started from an explicit assumption about the 
likelihood of change occurring at the top IPCC TAR rate, assumed an order of magnitude 
likelihood for the highest rate and then interpolated. A fourth expert adopted a similar 
approach, but using much higher estimates of likelihood because of a belief that the TAR 
“very likely underestimates sensitivity”. The remaining expert explicitly adopted a subjective 
approach. None of the four respondents who participated in the second round wished to 
change their estimates (one noted that if an estimate were revised, it would no longer be 
independent).  Three of the respondents expressed surprise at AC4’s estimates. Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
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Table 4:   Expert estimates of the likelihood (%) of accelerated climate change 
Global 
temperature 
change exceeds…  AC1 AC4 AC6  AC12 
 
 
AC13 
0.5
oC/decade  1 90 20  3  2 
0.6
 oC  /decade  0.1 80 10  0.5  0.5 
0.7
 oC /decade  0  70  5  0.1  0.1 
0.8
 oC /decade  0  60  2  0  0.01 
>0.9
 oC /decade  0  50  1  0  0.001 
 
 
4.3.6  Likelihood of rapid sea level rise 
 
Vaughan & Spouge (2002) conducted a Delphi survy of expert opinion of the likelihood of 
the West Antarctic Ice Sheet collapsing and raising sea levels. As with the surveys conducted 
for this project, there was a range of estimates of likelihood, but from the evidence presented 
Vaughan & Spouge (2002) came up with an assessment that there is a less than 5% chance 
that sea level rise due to the collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet would be greater than 10 
mm per year.  
 
The Vaughan & Spouge (2002) survey focused on the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, and did not 
consider explicitly any increase in sea level from melt of the Greenland Ice Sheet. Gregory et 
al. (2004) concluded from a model simulation that prolonged melt of the Greenland Ice Sheet 
was likely once temperatures increased by more than 3
oC, but this would be most noticeable 
late in the 21
st century and probably
5 would not affect expert assessments of the likelihood of 
rapid sea level rise over the next 100 years. 
 
 
5.  Impacts of abrupt climate change 
 
5.1 Assessing  impacts 
 
5.1.1 Potential  approaches 
 
Whilst there have been many quantitative or at least structured assessments of the 
implications of “gradual” climate change, there have been virtually no rigorous assessments 
of the implications of rapid or abrupt climate change. As Hulme (2003) notes, none of the 
frequently published claims that abrupt climate change would have severe consequences are 
based on substantive environmental, economic, or social research. The few studies which 
have attempted to make an integrated assessment of the global scale implications of abrupt 
climate change for the costs of mitigation and adaptation have, admittedly, simply assumed 
values for impacts (e.g. Keller et al. (2000) and Mastrandrea & Schneider (2001). 
 
In principle, there are three ways of estimating the impacts of abrupt climate change. The first 
is to use simulation models with quantitative scenarios of the potential changes in climate. 
Only one quantitative studies of possible future abrupt change have been published, largely 
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because there are no quantitative abrupt climate change scenarios
6: the exception (Higgins & 
Vellinga, 2004) explores the effect of thermohaline circulation collapse on ecosystem 
structure and function, but assumes no global warming. 
 
The second approach is to use analogues from past abrupt climate change events. There is a 
large literature on changes in the physical environment following past abrupt changes, 
including for example land cover (e.g. Van Geel et al., 1996; Tinner & Lotter, 2001) and 
fluvial systems (e.g. van Huissteden & Kasse, 2001). There is also an increasingly large 
literature on the effect of past abrupt climate changes on previous civilisations and societies. 
In a very early study, Parry (1974) showed how agricultural patterns in southern Scotland 
were affected by the Little Ice Age, and more recent studies have examined changes in other 
parts of the world associated with abrupt climate shifts, such as rapid cooling or changes in 
ENSO patterns (e.g. van Geel et al., 1996; Berglund, 2003; Sandweiss et al., 2001; Fagan, 
2004, Xoplaki et al., 2001). However, whilst there is some evidence that abrupt climate shifts 
have led to collapses of some civilisations and economies, the use of such analogues to assess 
impacts in the future is problematic. The impacts of a given change in climate (or indeed 
hazard event) depend very much on the characteristics and dynamics of the economy and 
society being impacted, including aspects such as distribution of income, governance and 
equity. It may be extremely difficult to separate out all the interacting causes of an identified 
impact (Messerli et al., 2000). 
 
The final approach uses expert judgement to assess the implications of defined abrupt climate 
changes. This approach was used in the ACACIA project (Parry, 2000) and is also the basis 
of the IPCC’s assessment of the impacts of climate change (Kundzewicz & Parry, 2001). 
Expert judgement of the impacts of abrupt climate change could be informed by studies of 
the impact of gradual climate change or assessments of vulnerability. The Pentagon survey 
was in effect an expert judgement review of the implications of thermohaline circulation 
collapse.  
 
5.1.2  Approach used in the current study 
 
The approach used in the current study was based on expert interpretation of published and 
“grey” literature on the implications of gradual climate change, in the context of the 
characterisations described in Section 3, supplemented by a number of computer simulations. 
These simulations, conducted for the current study, looked at changes in river runoff, changes 
crop suitability and energy requirements across Europe under the thermohaline circulation 
collapse and accelerated feedback scenarios, and are described below. 
 
The expert judgement was provided by the project team (who were involved in the ACACIA 
study of the impacts of gradual climate change in Europe), with input from some sectoral 
experts and climate change impact researchers involved in the EU-funded ATEAM project 
(ATEAM meeting, May 2004) and at a workshop on research into adaptation to climate 
change in Europe hosted by CICERO in Norway (May 2004). The assessment of the impacts 
of the three characterisations of abrupt climate change was made by major European region 
and by the UN’s “WEHAB” sectors (WEHAB stands for water, energy, health, agriculture 
and biodiversity) plus settlements. Changes in the WEHAB+ sectors will impact upon the 
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pattern of economic and social activity within a region, including conflict between groups, 
sectors and regions. The five regions are: 
 
Southern Europe  (Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece and southern France) 
Northern Europe  (Norway, Sweden and Finland) 
Western Europe  (UK, Ireland, northern France, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Switzerland and Denmark) 
Eastern Europe  (Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Slovenia, Austria) 
South-eastern Europe (Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, Albania, Rumania, Bulgaria, Macedonia) 
 
Whilst there is inevitably a degree of variability within the five regions, each country in a 
region has broadly the same climate regime and a broadly similar economic and political 
structure. 
 
Tables 5a to 5e show the potential impacts of the three abrupt climate change scenarios by 
region and sector, together with the implications of “gradual” climate change. Table 6 
summarises the key implications of the three abrupt climate change characterisations for 
Europe, based on the information in Tables 5a to 5e. The implications are shown in order of 
significance. The relative significance of each implication is, however, extremely uncertain, 
largely because there are no common metrics of impact on which to base a comparison (this 
is true not only for abrupt climate change, but also for “gradual” climate change).  
 
The quantitative impacts of climate change also depend on the state of the economy and 
society which is being impacted (Arnell et al., 2004), including population totals, total wealth 
and its distribution, distribution of economic activities, and governance. The IPCC’s SRES 
(IPCC, 2000) report describes four “storylines” for future development, broadly distinguished 
according to regional orientation and style of economic development. In terms of European 
population, the scenarios are not very different (and are less different than they are in other 
regions), but in terms of wealth and value of assets exposed to climate change are very 
different. 
 
The following sections provide greater description of the potential implications of abrupt 
climate change by sector, together with the supporting references.Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
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Table 5:  Impacts of abrupt climate change:   
(a) Southern Europe (Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, southern France) 
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Water      
Public supply and 
demand 
 - river flows and 
recharge 
 
• Decrease in runoff and 
recharge 
 
• Reduction in total runoff 
of at least 50% for at least 
30 years 
• Reduction in runoff of  
50% by 2050 
 
 
- demand  • Incease in peak demands  • Reductions in peak 
demands 
• Large increase in peak 
demands 
 
Irrigation   • Increase in demand  • Reduction in demand  • Large increase in demand  • Lowlying irrigated land 
inundated 
Floods  • Increase in risk of winter 
flooding 
• Shift from winter to 
spring snowmelt flooding 
• Increase in risk of winter 
flooding 
• Large rise in risk to 
coastal zones 
Navigation  • Small change in 
opportunities due to 
increasing flow range 
• Increase in ice cover: 
reduced opportunities 
• Large reductions in 
opportunities due to 
higher winter and lower 
summer flows 
• Navigability in lower 
reaches affected by tides 
Energy      
Demand  • Increase in summer 
cooling requirements 
• Large increase in heating 
requirements 
• Large increase in summer 
cooling requirements 
•  - 
Renewable 
generation 
• Lower hydropower 
potential throughout  year 
• Reduced hydropower 
potential and shift to 
spring 
• Reduced wind potential 
• Lower hydropower 
potential throughout  year  
• Increased wind potential 
in winter 
• Altered feasibility of tidal 
power schemes 
 
Non-renewable 
generation  
• Reduced availability of 
summer cooling water 
  • Reduced availability of 
summer cooling water 
 
• Coastal facilities 
threatened 
Distribution  • Increased storminess 
affects winter network 
• Network susceptible to 
freeze events 
• Increased storminess 
affects winter network 
• - 
Health      
Thermal effects  • Increased heat-related 
deaths in summer 
• Increased cold-related 
deaths in winter 
• Increased heat-related 
deaths in summer 
• - 
Disease  • Increased potential for 
disease transmission 
• Reduced potential for 
disease transmission 
• Increased potential for 
disease transmission 
• - 
Agriculture      
Crop productivity  • Decrease in productivity  • Decrease in productivity  • Major decrease in 
productivity 
• - 
Food production  • Decrease  • Decrease  • Decrease  • - 
Forestry  • Increased fire risk  • Major adverse effects on 
broadleaved forest 
• Increased fire risk 
• Fire risk severe 
• Summer droughts 
adversely affect all 
species  
• - 
Fisheries  • increased risk of failure of 
coastal fisheries 
•   • increased risk of failure of 
coastal fisheries 
•  
Biodiversity      
Natural areas  • Northward shift in natural 
ecosystems 
• Major changes across 
region 
• Northward shift in natural 
ecosystems 
• Coastal wetlands lost 
Settlement and infrastructure 
Urban areas  • Increased urban heat 
island 
• Reduced summer comfort 
• Increased building 
damage 
• Reduced winter comfort  • Increased urban heat 
island 
• Large reductions in 
summer comfort 
• Large increase in damage 
• Inundation 
Transportation  •   • Increased winter 
disruption 
• Summer heat-related 
problems on railways 
• Coastal-zone 
infrastructure threatened 
Security      
Conflict  •   • Global scale disruption  • North-south conflict in 
Europe 
• Coastal/inland conflict 
Population 
movement 
• -  • Immigration from the 
north 
• In-migration from outside 
Europe 
• Movement away from 
coastal zone Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
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  (b) Northern Europe (Norway, Sweden, Finland) 
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Water      
Public supply and 
demand 
 - river flows and 
recharge 
 
 
 
• Increase in runoff and 
recharge 
 
 
 
• Reduction in total runoff 
of at least 50% for at least 
30 years 
 
 
• Reduction in runoff of  up 
to 20% by 2050 
 
 
- demand  • Incease in peak demands  • Reductions in peak 
demands 
• Large increase in peak 
demands 
 
Irrigation   • Some increase in demand  • Reduction in demand  • Large increase in demand  • Lowlying irrigated land 
inundated 
Floods  • Increase in risk of winter 
flooding: shift from winter 
to spring flooding 
• Shift from winter to 
spring snowmelt flooding 
• Increase in risk of winter 
flooding 
• Large rise in risk to 
coastal zones 
Navigation  • -  • -  • -  • - 
Energy      
Demand  • Increase in summer 
cooling requirements 
• Large increase in heating 
requirements 
• Large increase in summer 
cooling requirements 
•  - 
Renewable 
generation 
• Lower hydropower 
potential throughout  year 
• Reduced hydropower 
potential and shift to 
spring 
• Reduced wind potential 
• Lower hydropower 
potential throughout  year  
• Increased wind potential 
in winter 
• Altered feasibility of tidal 
power schemes 
 
Non-renewable 
generation  
• Reduced availability of 
summer cooling water 
  • Reduced availability of 
summer cooling water 
 
• Coastal facilities 
threatened 
Distribution  • Increased storminess 
affects winter network 
• Network susceptible to 
freeze events 
• Increased storminess 
affects winter network 
• - 
Health      
Thermal effects  • Increased heat-related 
deaths in summer 
• Increased cold-related 
deaths in winter 
• Increased heat-related 
deaths in summer 
• - 
Disease  • Increased potential for 
disease transmission 
• Reduced potential for 
disease transmission 
• Increased potential for 
disease transmission 
• - 
Agriculture      
Crop productivity  • Decrease in productivity  • Decrease in productivity  • Major decrease in 
productivity 
• - 
Food production  • Decrease  • Decrease  • Decrease  • - 
Forestry  • Increased fire risk  • Major adverse effects on 
broadleaved forest 
• Increased fire risk 
• Fire risk severe 
• Summer droughts 
adversely affect all 
species  
• - 
Fisheries  • Reduced potential for 
established fisheries; 
possible new species 
• Reduced potential for 
established fisheries 
• Reduced potential for 
established fisheries; 
possible new species 
•  
Biodiversity      
Natural areas  • Northward shift in natural 
ecosystems 
• Major changes across 
region 
• Northward shift in natural 
ecosystems 
• Coastal wetlands lost 
Settlement and infrastructure 
Urban areas  • Increased urban heat 
island 
• Reduced summer comfort 
• Incrtease in damage 
• Reduced winter comfort 
• Increase in damage due to 
ice/snow 
• Increased urban heat 
island 
• Large reductions in 
summer comfort 
• Large increase in damage 
• Inundation 
Transportation  •   • Increased winter 
disruption 
• Summer heat-related 
problems on railways 
• Reduced ice cover at ports 
• Coastal-zone 
infrastructure threatened 
Security      
Conflict  •   • Global scale disruption  • North-south conflict in 
Europe 
• Coastal/inland conflict 
Population 
movement 
• -  • Immigration from the 
north 
• In-migration from outside 
Europe 
• Movement away from 
coastal zone Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
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 (c)   Western Europe (UK, Ireland, northern France, Germany, Belgium, 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Denmark) 
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Water      
Public supply and 
demand 
 - river flows and 
recharge 
 
• Increase in winter runoff, 
decrease in summer 
 
• Reduction in total runoff 
of at least 30% for at least 
30 years 
• Shift to snow-dominated 
regimes: lower flows in 
winter 
• Reduction in total runoff 
of at least 40% by 2050 
• Increased range in flows 
through the year, with 
lower summer flows 
 
- demand  • Incease in peak demands  • Reductions in peak 
demands 
• Large increase in peak 
demands 
 
Irrigation   • Increase in demand  • Reduction in demand  • Large increase in demand  • Lowlying irrigated land 
inundated 
Floods  • Increase in risk of winter 
flooding 
• Shift from winter to spring 
snowmelt flooding 
• Increase in risk of winter 
flooding 
• Large rise in risk to 
coastal zones 
Navigation  • Small change in 
opportunities due to 
increasing flow range 
• Increase in ice cover: 
reduced opportunities 
• Large reductions in 
opportunities due to 
higher winter and lower 
summer flows 
• Navigability in lower 
reaches affected by tides 
Energy      
Demand  • Increase in summer 
cooling requirements 
• Large increase in heating 
requirements 
• Large increase in summer 
cooling requirements 
•  - 
Renewable 
generation 
• Increase winter 
hydropower potential, 
lower summer potential 
• Reduced hydropower 
potential and shift to 
spring 
• Reduced wind potential 
• Increased winter 
hydropower, but reduced 
generation in summer 
• Increased wind potential 
in winter 
• Altered feasibility of tidal 
power schemes 
 
Non-renewable 
generation  
• Reduced availability of 
summer cooling water 
  • Reduced availability of 
summer cooling water 
 
• Coastal facilities 
threatened 
Distribution  • Increased storminess 
affects winter network 
• Network susceptible to 
freeze events 
• Increased storminess 
affects winter network 
• - 
Health      
Thermal effects  • Increased heat-related 
deaths in summer 
• Increased cold-related 
deaths in winter 
• Increased heat-related 
deaths in summer 
• - 
Disease  • Increased potential for 
disease transmission 
• Reduced potential for 
disease transmission 
• Increased potential for 
disease transmission 
• - 
Agriculture      
Crop productivity  • Increase in productivity  • Decrease in productivity  • Increase in productivity  • - 
Food production  • Increase  • Decrease  • Increase  • - 
Forestry  • Faster growth in conifere  • Reduction in growth and 
yield 
• Much faster growth in 
conifers 
• Summer droughts 
adversely affect all species  
• - 
Fisheries  • Reduced fisheries 
production 
• Reduced fisheries 
production 
• Reduced fisheries 
production 
•  
Biodiversity      
Natural areas  • Northward shift in natural 
ecosystems 
• Major changes across 
region 
• Northward shift in natural 
ecosystems 
• Coastal wetlands lost 
Settlements and infrastructure 
Urban areas  • Increased urban heat 
island 
• Reduced summer comfort 
• Incrtease in damage 
• Reduced winter comfort 
• Increase in snow/ice 
damage 
• Increased urban heat 
island 
• Large reductions in 
summer comfort 
• Large increase in damage 
• Inundation 
Transportation  •   • Increased winter 
disruption and blockage of 
ports by ice 
• Summer heat-related 
problems on railways 
• Reduced ice cover 
• Coastal-zone 
infrastructure threatened 
Security      
Conflict  •   • Global scale disruption  • North-south conflict in 
Europe 
• Coastal/inland conflict 
Population 
movement 
• -  • Depopulation  • In-migration from outside 
Europe 
• Movement away from 
coastal zone Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
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(d)  Eastern Europe (Poland, Baltic states, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Slovenia, Austria) 
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Water      
Public supply and 
demand 
 - river flows and 
recharge 
 
 
 
• Decrease in runoff and 
recharge 
• Shift to winter maxima 
from spring 
 
 
 
• Reduction in total runoff of 
at least 50% for at least 30 
years 
 
 
• Reduction in runoff of  
>50% by 2050 
• Elimination of snowmelt 
peak 
 
 
- demand  • Incease in peak demands  • Reductions in peak 
demands 
• Large increase in peak 
demands 
 
Irrigation   • Increase in demand  • Reduction in demand  • Large increase in demand  • Lowlying irrigated land 
inundated 
Floods  • Increase in risk of winter 
flooding 
• Shift from winter to spring 
snowmelt flooding 
• Increase in risk of winter 
flooding 
• Large rise in risk to coastal 
zones 
Navigation  • Small change in 
opportunities due to 
increasing flow range 
• Increase in ice cover: 
reduced opportunities 
• Large reductions in 
opportunities due to higher 
winter and lower summer 
flows 
• Navigability in lower 
reaches affected by tides 
Energy      
Demand  • Increase in summer 
cooling requirements 
• Large increase in heating 
requirements 
• Large increase in summer 
cooling requirements 
•  - 
Renewable 
generation 
• Lower hydropower 
potential throughout  year 
• Reduced hydropower 
potential and shift to spring 
• Reduced wind potential 
• Lower hydropower 
potential throughout  year  
• Increased wind potential in 
winter 
•  
Non-renewable 
generation  
• Reduced availability of 
summer cooling water 
  • Reduced availability of 
summer cooling water 
 
• Coastal facilities 
threatened 
Distribution  • Increased storminess 
affects winter network 
• Network susceptible to 
freeze events 
• Increased storminess 
affects winter network 
• - 
Health      
Thermal effects  • Increased heat-related 
deaths in summer 
• Increased cold-related 
deaths in winter 
• Increased heat-related 
deaths in summer 
• - 
Disease  • Increased potential for 
disease transmission 
• Reduced potential for 
disease transmission 
• Increased potential for 
disease transmission 
• - 
Agriculture      
Crop productivity  • Decrease in productivity  • Decrease in productivity  • Major decrease in 
productivity 
• - 
Food production  • Decrease  • Decrease  • Decrease  • - 
Forestry  • Increased fire risk  • Major adverse effects on 
broadleaved forest 
• Increased fire risk 
• Fire risk severe 
• Summer droughts 
adversely affect all species  
• - 
Fisheries  • -  • -  • -  • - 
Biodiversity      
Natural areas  • Northward shift in natural 
ecosystems 
• Major changes across 
region 
• Northward shift in natural 
ecosystems 
• Coastal wetlands lost 
Settlements and infrastructure 
Urban areas  • Increased urban heat island 
• Reduced summer comfort 
• Increase in damage 
• Reduced winter comfort 
• Increase in snow/ice 
damage 
• Increased urban heat island 
• Large reductions in 
summer comfort 
• Large increase in damage 
• Inundation 
Transportation  •   • Increased winter disruption 
• Increased ice cover at ports 
• Summer heat-related 
problems on railways 
• Reduced ice cover 
• Coastal-zone infrastructure 
threatened 
Security      
Conflict  •   • Global scale disruption  • North-south conflict in 
Europe 
• Coastal/inland conflict 
Population 
movement 
• -  • Immigration from the north  • In-migration from outside 
Europe 
• Movement away from 
coastal zone Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
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(e)  South-eastern Europe (Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, Albania, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Macedonia) 
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Water      
Public supply and 
demand 
 - river flows and 
recharge 
 
 
 
• Decrease in runoff and 
recharge 
 
 
 
• Reduction in total runoff of 
at least 50% for at least 30 
years 
 
 
• Reduction in runoff of  
>50% by 2050 
 
 
- demand  • Incease in peak demands  • Reductions in peak 
demands 
• Large increase in peak 
demands 
 
Irrigation   • Increase in demand  • Reduction in demand  • Large increase in demand  • Lowlying irrigated land 
inundated 
Floods  • Increase in risk of winter 
flooding 
• Shift from winter to spring 
snowmelt flooding 
• Increase in risk of winter 
flooding 
• Large rise in risk to coastal 
zones 
Navigation  • Small change in 
opportunities due to 
increasing flow range 
• Increase in ice cover: 
reduced opportunities 
• Large reductions in 
opportunities due to higher 
winter and lower summer 
flows 
• Navigability in lower 
reaches affected by tides 
Energy      
Demand  • Increase in summer 
cooling requirements 
• Large increase in heating 
requirements 
• Large increase in summer 
cooling requirements 
•  - 
Renewable 
generation 
• Lower hydropower 
potential throughout  year 
• Reduced hydropower 
potential and shift to spring 
• Reduced wind potential 
• Lower hydropower 
potential throughout  year  
• Increased wind potential in 
winter 
• Altered feasibility of tidal 
power schemes 
 
Non-renewable 
generation  
• Reduced availability of 
summer cooling water 
  • Reduced availability of 
summer cooling water 
 
• Coastal facilities 
threatened 
Distribution  • Increased storminess 
affects winter network 
• Network susceptible to 
freeze events 
• Increased storminess 
affects winter network 
• - 
Health      
Thermal effects  • Increased heat-related 
deaths in summer 
• Increased cold-related 
deaths in winter 
• Increased heat-related 
deaths in summer 
• - 
Disease  • Increased potential for 
disease transmission 
• Reduced potential for 
disease transmission 
• Increased potential for 
disease transmission 
• - 
Agriculture      
Crop productivity  • Decrease in productivity  • Small decrease in 
productivity 
• Major decrease in 
productivity 
• - 
Food production  • Decrease  • Decrease  • Decrease  • - 
Forestry  • Increased fire risk  • Major adverse effects on 
broadleaved forest 
• Increased fire risk 
• Fire risk severe 
• Summer droughts 
adversely affect all species  
• - 
Fisheries  •   •   •   •  
Biodiversity      
Natural areas  • Northward shift in natural 
ecosystems 
• Major changes across 
region 
• Northward shift in natural 
ecosystems 
• Coastal wetlands lost 
Settlements and infrastructure 
Urban areas  • Increased urban heat island 
• Reduced summer comfort 
• Increase in damage 
• Reduced winter comfort  • Increased urban heat island 
• Large reductions in 
summer comfort 
• Large increase in damage 
• Inundation 
Transportation  •   • Increased winter disruption  • Summer heat-related 
problems on railways 
• Coastal-zone infrastructure 
threatened 
Security      
Conflict  •   • Global scale disruption  • North-south conflict in 
Europe 
• Coastal/inland conflict 
Population 
movement 
• -  • Immigration from the north  • In-migration from outside 
Europe 
• Movement away from 
coastal zone 
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Table 6:  Major implications of abrupt climate change in Europe 
Collapse of the thermohaline circulation 
•  Major reductions in crop production, with consequent impacts on food prices, access 
to food, and rural economies 
•  Increases in cold-related deaths and ill-health 
•  Movement of populations to southern Europe, and shift in centre of economic gravity 
•  Major changes in temperate and Mediterranean ecosystems and the services they 
provide (food, biodiversity, forest products, recreation) 
•  Disruption to winter travel opportunities and increased icing of northern ports and 
seas 
•  Requirement to refurbish infrastructure, especially in western Europe, towards 
Scandinavian standards 
•  Reductions in runoff and water availability in southern Europe, and major increase in 
snowmelt flooding in western Europe 
Accelerated climate change 
•  Major reductions in crop production, with consequent impacts on food prices, access 
to food, and rural economies 
•  Increase in summer heat-related mortality and ill-health, and increased risk of 
transmission of disease 
•  Major reductions in water availability in southern and western Europe, coupled with 
large increases in demand for water, particularly for irrigation 
•  Major changes in boreal and Mediterranean ecosystems and the services they provide 
•  Requirement to refurbish infrastructure, especially in western and northern Europe 
•  Reduction in ice cover in northern ports and seas 
Rapid sea level rise 
•  Inundation of parts of coastal cities (including London, Hamburg, Venice, Amsterdam 
and Rotterdam), coastal wetlands and deltas 
•  Inundation of coastal facilities, including ports and power stations 
•  Very substantial increase in coastal flooding damages and requirement for major 
investment in coastal flood defences 
•  Major threat to viability of the financial services industry, particularly insurance 
•  Relocation of economic activity away from coastal cities 
 
 
5.2 Water 
 
5.2.1  Water supply and demand 
 
The reliability of water supply systems – for public supplies, industrial use or irrigation – is a 
function of the relationship between the ability to supply water and demand for that water. In 
any given catchment, the ability to supply water depends on its volume and timing through 
the year and the infrastructure available to store and distribute water. Changes in the amount 
of water available through the year are potentially extremely important, although their effects 
depend on supply infrastructure. For reservoir-supported or groundwater supply systems 
changes in wet season rainfall are most important, whilst for unsupported direct river Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
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abstractions from small to medium-sized rivers changes in runoff at any time of the year may 
be critical. 
 
A macro-scale hydrological model previously used in hydrological impact assessments 
(Arnell, 2003; 2004) was used to assess the implications of the thermohaline circulation 
collapse and accelerated climate change scenarios (Figures 7 and 8). Under the “gradual” 
climate change scenario used here (based on the HadCM3 climate model) annual runoff 
decreases across most of Europe, with the exception of northern and western areas
7. 
Accelerated climate change essentially produces larger percentage reductions and reduces the 
area with an increase in runoff. Although precipitation is increased across much of Europe, 
this is more than offset by the higher evaporation associated with higher temperatures. 
Thermohaline circulation collapse also results in a reduction in runoff across most of Europe 
(but an increase in northern and western Britain). This is largely due to a reduction in 
precipitation across Europe: the lower temperatures mean lower evaporation.  
 
Changes in the distribution of runoff through the year are perhaps as significant as changes in 
the total volume of runoff. Figure 9 shows mean monthly runoff in a number of catchments 
under current conditions and in the 2050s, following gradual climate change, accelerated 
change and the collapse of the thermohaline circulation in 2015. “Gradual” climate change 
tends to increase the seasonality of flows in temperate western Europe and produce a shift in 
flows from spring to winter in central Europe as precipitation falls as rain rather than snow. 
Accelerated climate change exaggerates this tendency, and over a larger part of Europe there 
is a shift from spring snowmelt peaks to winter maxima. Collapse of the thermohaline 
circulation, however, leads to a shift in peak flows from winter to spring across much of 
western Europe (where more precipitation falls as snow), but has relatively little affect on 
flow regimes in central and eastern Europe which are already snow-dominated. 
 
There have been very few published assessments of the implications of “conventional” 
climate change for the reliability of public water supplies. Studies in England suggest 
possible reductions in reliable yields by the 2020s of between 6 and 13% in some catchment 
areas (Arnell & Delaney, 2005), which would severely challenge the provision of supplies to 
customers during drought years. Both thermohaline circulation collapse and accelerated 
climate change are likely to make this situation even more challenging, as both imply a 
reduction in available runoff. 
 
Climate change is also likely to impact upon the infrastructure used to treat and distribute 
both potable water and sewage effluent. Thermohaline circulation collapse would increase the 
risk of frost damage to pipe networks in maritime parts of Europe, whilst accelerated climate 
change would increase the risk of damage due to the drying and shrinking of soils. 
 
                                                 
7 scenarios based on other climate models produce broadly similar spatial patterns of change, although in some 
the area with an increase in runoff is more extensive (Arnell, 2003) Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
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Figure 7:  Change in average annual runoff, assuming thermohaline circulation collapse 
in 2015 and 2035, with A2 emissions 
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Figure 8:  Change in average annual runoff, assuming A2 emissions and accelerated 
climate change 
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Figure 9:  Mean monthly runoff in different parts of Europe, under current conditions 
and in the 2050s under A2 emissions, accelerated climate change and 
thermohaline circulation collapse in 2015
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The primary effect of climate change on demand for water is through changes in growing 
season soil moisture deficits: these affect both domestic demand and, most importantly, 
demand for irrigation water. Soil moisture deficits are a function of spring and summer 
rainfall and temperature (or, more precisely, evaporation). Actual demands for irrigation 
water, however, are also determined by the crop types grown and irrigation efficiency. Whilst 
thermohaline circulation collapse, for example, might appear to lead to an increased demand 
for irrigation because available water decreases, the lower temperatures might mean that 
cultivation of crops which require irrigation is less feasible. Similarly, accelerated climate 
change might mean temperatures become too high for crops currently grown with irrigation.  
 
Rapid sea level rise has much less impact on water supply reliability than accelerated climate 
change or thermohaline circulation collapse. The primary impacts are through the reduced 
reliability of river water abstraction points that are close to the tidal limit, and increased 
saline intrusion up major rivers and aquifers. This is likely to be particularly important in the 
Netherlands, where higher sea levels would increase the salinity not only of the Rhine but 
also the shallow groundwaters which provide a large proportion of agricultural and public 
supplies. 
 
 
5.2.2  Floods and their management 
 
There are currently three types of fluvial floods in Europe: floods following prolonged 
saturation during the “wet” season (in winter in western Europe, summer in parts of eastern 
and central Europe), floods following snowmelt in spring, and floods following short-
duration intense rainfall events (typically in summer). The frequency of coastal flooding 
depends on sea level and the frequency of occurrence of storm surges (Nicholls, 2004). The 
economic and social impacts of both fluvial and coastal flooding in the future will depend on 
the numbers of people living in flood-prone areas and the value of their assets, together with 
the degree of protection against flooding. 
 
Thermohaline circulation collapse would lessen the risk of winter flooding in western Europe 
because precipitation would be more likely to fall as snow, but shift the peak flood season to 
spring snowmelt period. Whether these peaks would be higher or lower than the current 
winter peaks depends on both the volume of snowfall during winter and the rate at which that 
snow would melt, but in any case the characteristics of the flood regime would change 
substantially. It is possible that reliable flood forecasting would become easier, as it would be 
based on information on accumulated snowfall. In central and eastern Europe thermohaline 
circulation collapse is likely to delay the snowmelt season (see Figure 9), perhaps leading to 
larger snowmelt floods as the snow accumulation season is lengthened. 
 
Accelerated climate change would increase the risk of winter flooding in western Europe and 
summer flooding in central and eastern Europe, as the intensity of the hydrological cycle 
increases. Reductions in snowfall would lead to a shift in the peak flood season from spring 
to winter in parts of upland, central and eastern Europe: the effect on the magnitude of peaks 
depends on changes in the volume of peak winter rainfalls. 
 
An increasing risk of coastal flooding is one of the most widely cited impacts of sea level 
rise. Nicholls (2004) estimates that by the 2080s an additional 0.2-1.6 million people in 
Europe would be affected by coastal flooding each year, depending largely on assumed rates Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
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of change in coastal populations. This is based on a sea level rise of up to 34cm, but rapid sea 
level rise due to collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet could lead to a rise of 2.2m by the 
2080s. This is likely to increase very substantially the numbers of people affected by coastal 
flooding, and it is clearly not possible to extrapolate from studies of the impacts of 
conventional climate change. Major European cities including London, Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam, Copenhagen, Hamburg, Stockholm, Helsinki, Barcelona and Venice would be 
extremely seriously affected by rapid sea level rise. 
 
5.2.3 Navigation 
 
Most of the major rivers in Europe are used for commerical navigation (e.g. the Rhine, 
Rhone, Elbe, Danube). Navigability is primarily influenced by the depth of water and, in 
eastern Europe, by the duration of ice-free conditions (Middelkoop et al., 2001). 
Conventional climate change would reduce the impact of ice, but by increasing low flows and 
possibly increasing high flows potentially shorten the navigation season (Middelkoop et al., 
2001). 
 
Collapse of the thermohaline circulation would increase the duration of ice cover on 
navigable rivers, and hence reduce navigation opportunities. Accelerated climate change 
would reduce ice cover, but increase still further the variability in river flows through the year 
and hence probably reduce the navigation season. Rapid sea level rise would primarily affect 
inland navigation through saline intrusion into the lower reaches of major rivers and the 
inundation of riverside infrastructure such as docks. 
 
 
5.3 Energy 
 
5.3.1 Demand  for  energy 
 
The vast bulk of the literature on future energy demand is concerned with effects of different 
growth rates, extent of innovation and changing patterns of energy use: there is relatively 
little quantitative information on the implications of climate change for demand. The main 
effects of climatic variability are on the demand for space heating fuels and the amount of 
electricity used for air conditioning and refrigeration.  
 
The extent of the change in the requirement for heating and cooling can be inferred from 
changes in the number of heating (HDD) and cooling (CDD) degree days per year. Figure 10 
shows the change in HDD and CDD by the 2050s, under the A2 emissions scenario, 
thermohaline circulation collapse in 2015, and accelerated climate change. HDD is calculated 
from daily mean temperature Ti simply as: 
 
 HDD  =  Σ (15.5 - Ti)             where Ti is less than 15.5
oC 
 
CDD is calculated from: 
 
 CDD  =  Σ (Ti – 22)    where Ti is greater than 22
 oC 
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Figure 10:  Change in heating and cooling requirements by 2050, under A2 emissions, 
thermohaline circulation collapse in 2015, and accelerated climate change Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
 40  February  2005 
Daily mean temperature Ti is estimated from the monthly mean temperature by fitting a sine 
function through the monthly series, and Figure 10 can therefore be regarded as being 
indicative only. 
 
Under gradual climate change, heating requirement falls by the 2050s by up to 25% (relative 
to 1961-1990) across most of Europe, and cooling requirement increases everywhere except 
for Scotland, Ireland, Norway and northern Sweden. Thermohaline circulation collapse in 
2015 leads to increases in heating requirement by the 2050s by up to 25% across most of 
Europe, with relatively little effect in the far north east. It also still leads to increases in 
cooling requirements in parts of southern Europe (in decades closer to thermohaline 
circulation collapse heating requirements increase further and cooling requirements 
decrease). Accelerated climate change produces very large percentage reductions in heating 
requirements, and increases in cooling requirements across virtually the whole of Europe.  
 
Translating these changes to energy demand, however, is complicated by secular changes in 
demand (air conditioning in Europe is becoming much more widespread) and technological 
innovations. In the UK, the Climate Change Impacts Review Group (CCIRG, 1996) 
estimated that higher temperatures under an A2-type emissions scenario would lead to a 5% 
fall in energy demand by the 2050s, relative to the demand without climate change. 
Levermore et al. (2004) simulated a reduction in heating requirements in a hypothetical office 
building by 2050 of between 6 and 12%, depending on construction type, under the A2 
emissions scenario,and an increase in cooling requirements of 10-20%: heating demands 
remained higher than cooling demands. The ACACIA report (Parry, 2000) cites a study 
showing a doubling of demand for energy for cooling in Europe with a 4.5
oC rise in 
temperature: this is close to the rise by the 2050s under accelerated change.  
 
Climate change, whether gradual or abrupt, will change not only the gross magnitude of 
energy demands, but also its timing. Both gradual and accelerated change will lead to a shift 
in demand from winter heating to summer cooling; thermohaline circulation collapse will 
lead to an increasing concentration of demand in winter.  
 
5.3.2 Energy  generation 
 
Climate change has five broad implications for energy generation: it affects the viability of 
renewable sources, energy-from-biomass schemes, availability of cooling water, extraction of 
offshore oil and gas, and physical infrastructure. 
 
The key renewable energy sources in Europe at present are hydropower (large-scale and 
micro) and wind, with tidal and wave turbines likely to become more significant during the 
21
st century. The viability of hydropower generation depends on changes in the volume and 
timing of streamflow: Lehner et al. (2005) show that even moderate climate change would 
lead to reductions in hydropower potentials of 25% and more in parts of southern and 
southeastern Europe.  Wind generation potential is rather obviously determined by 
windspeeds and their consistencies. Climate models do not simulate windspeeds very 
accurately so scenarios are difficult to construct, but indications are that climate change has 
relatively little effect on windspeeds across Europe (Hansen et al., 2004). 
 
The viability of energy from biomass depends of course on biomass productivity. The species 
most widely used in Europe include willow and miscanthus, whose productivity is largely 
determined by the length of the growing season (Olesen & Bindi, 2002). Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
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Thermal power stations require cooling water, taken in practice either from rivers or the sea. 
Lower summer river flows have in recent drought years led to reductions in output from 
French nuclear power stations, and have the potential to cause more widespread problems in 
the future (see Section 5.2). Thermohaline circulation collapse would lead to lower flows in 
winter across much of western Europe (because precipitation falls as snow rather than rain), 
possibly reducing the amount of cooling water available during what would be the peak 
demand season. 
 
The extraction of offshore oil and gas is potentially sensitive to climate change if the 
frequency of extreme weather conditions increases. The impacts of thermohaline circulation 
are likely to be most significant, as lower temperatures and icing would cause increased 
production difficulties even in the absence of changed storm frequency.  
 
Finally, much energy generation infrastructure is vulnerable to climate change, particularly 
that located around the coast: many thermal power stations are located at the coast for access 
to cooling water, and most would be threatened by rapid sea level rise. 
 
5.3.3 Energy  distribution 
 
Energy distribution, particularly the transmission of electricity, is vulnerable to extreme 
climate events, and the transmission efficiency of power lines falls as temperature rises. 
Energy distribution is likely to be most severely challenged by thermohaline circulation 
collapse, because the frequency of icing of power lines would increase substantially. The 
precise impact, however, will depend on how interconnected the European energy 
distribution network is in the future. A move towards the use of more local micro-grids, for 
example, would reduce sensitivity of energy distribution to disruption. 
 
 
5.4 Health 
 
5.4.1  Thermal effects on health 
 
Cold winters and hot summers in Europe both tend to lead to an increase in mortality (Parry, 
2000). In northern Europe excess mortality is greater in winter than summer, whilst in 
southern Europe most heat-related deaths are during summer (particularly during very hot 
summers). Low temperatures in winter and high temperatures in summer both exacerbate 
respiratory and circulatory problems, particularly amongst the elderly and frail, and effects 
are greatest in urban areas. The precise effects of a given temperature anomaly, however, 
depend on acclimatisation and social and behavioural adaptations to weather conditions 
(including such measures as quality of housing stock). Mortality during a cold winter, for 
example, increases most in countries with normally mild winters. 
 
Several studies have developed and applied empirical statistical relationships between 
temperature and mortality in order to estimate the effects of future climate change. In the UK, 
for example, gradual climate change has the potential to increase the average annual number 
of summer heat deaths by the 2050s from around 800 to approximately 2800 (Department of 
Health, 2001), but to decrease the number of winter cold deaths from around 80,000 to 
60,000. Dessai (2003) estimated a smaller percentage increase in heat-related deaths in 
Lisbon, amongst a population already well acclimatised to warm conditions. Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
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Accelerated climate change would exaggerate these trends even more, potentially leading to 
extremely large increases in the numbers of summer heat-related deaths and reducing winter 
mortality in northern Europe. Thermohaline circulation collapse would lead to very 
substantial increases in winter mortality, particularly in western Europe where winters are 
currently relatively mild, and probably little change in summer mortality. 
 
5.4.2 Disease  and  ill-health 
 
Climate change has the potential to alter patterns of disease and ill-health by changing the 
distribution of disease vectors and altering the frequency of extreme events such as floods. 
 
Most research attention has been directed towards potential changes in the risk of malaria 
transmission (e.g. van Lieshout et al., 2004). Warmer temperatures in general would lead to 
an expansion in the potential habitat of the mosquitoes which carry the parasites which bear 
malaria, although this may be offset by reductions in the amount of rainfall and hence 
available water bodies. Impacts on malaria, however, will be dependent on the state of public 
health: if current standards in Europe are maintained, it is unlikely that malaria would 
become re-established (Parry, 2000). Other vector-borne diseases potentially susceptible to 
climate change include leishmaniasis (vectors present in southern Europe) and tick-borne 
diseases such as tick-borne encephalitus and Lyme’s disease (present across much of 
Europe). In each case, higher temperatures are likely to lengthen the transmission period and 
extend the areas affected northwards.  
 
Accelerated climate change would increase still further potential for transmission of all these 
vector-borne diseases, whilst thermohaline circulation collapse would reduce transmission 
potential. 
 
Floods, both inland and coastal, have a number of potential effects on health and disease, 
ranging from death and injury, through infection from water-borne diseases to stress (Hagat 
et al., 2003). Increasing flood frequency across Europe (see Section 5.2) may increase 
disaster-related ill-health. Rapid sea level rise would have a particularly large effect on flood 
frequency. 
 
5.5 Agriculture 
 
5.5.1  Agricultural productivity in Europe 
 
Over the last decade there have been many studies into the potential effect of future climate 
change on productivity of a wide range of crops in Europe (see Olesen & Bindi (2002) and 
Fuhrer (2003) for reviews). In general, the effects of climate change on productivity depend 
on the interactions between changes in CO2 concentration, the length of the growing season, 
water availability, and pests and diseases. Under a scenario of gradual warming, productivity 
in general is likely to increase in northern Europe as growing seasons lengthen and areas with 
suitable climates move northwards, and decrease in southern Europe as heat stress and water 
shortages become more significant (Olesen & Bindi, 2002). The precise quantitative effects 
of climate change vary between crop types and individual cultivars (Olesen & Bindi, 2002), 
and also with assumed changes in agricultural efficiency and use of technology. 
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There have been no published quantitative studies of the effect of accelerated climate change 
or thermohaline circulation collapse on agricultural productivity (although Engvild (2003) 
showed how sensitive productivity was to cooling caused by any change). Figure 11 shows 
changes in crop suitability across Europe under gradual climate change, thermohaline 
circulation collapse and accelerated climate change. Crop suitability is a function of an index 
of growing degree days (similar to HDD above, but with a temperature threshold of 5
oC) and 
the ratio of actual to potential evaporation (Ramankutty et al., 2002). Under gradual change 
suitability increases in northern Europe and decreases in parts of southern Europe. 
Accelerated climate change enhances this pattern. Thermohaline circulation collapse leads to 
reductions in suitability across large parts of western Europe, as well as in southern Europe.  
 
5.5.2  Implications of changes in global food production 
 
Whilst changes in productivity in Europe will affect farm incomes and the rural economy, 
changes in food prices and therefore risk of hunger are much more affected by changes in the 
global food market (Parry et al., 2004). Gradual climate change results in a general shift in 
world food production to higher latitudes, with increases in production of cereals in 
developed countries compensating, to a large extent, for reductions in developing countries 
(Parry et al., 2004). Food prices would increase, and the risk of hunger – particularly in 
Africa – would also rise, with the precise effects depending, once again, on the characteristics 
of the future global economy and society. 
 
Accelerated climate change would have the result of increasing this polarisation, and would 
probably therefore increase food prices. Thermohaline circulation collapse, however, would 
probably have a much larger effect on food prices and hence risk of hunger, because it would 
reduce substantially cereal production in the high latitude, developed country regions which 
currently produce the bulk of the world’s traded cereals. 
 
5.5.3 Forestry 
 
As with agriculture, there has been a large amount of research in Europe over the last decade 
examining the potential effects of gradual climate change on forest resources. Much has been 
funded by the European Union. The general conclusion (e.g. Parry, 2000; Nabuurs et al., 
2002) is that productivity will increase in northern Europe, and the boreal forest zone will 
expand northwards. However, the rate of northwards displacement of climatic suitability will 
be greater than the estimated potential of many species of migrate (Parry, 2000), so the boreal 
forest zone may in practice be squeezed by declining suitability in the south and a slow rate 
of migration northwards. Fire risk is likely to increase (Stocks et al., 1998), but increased 
productivity would probably offset increased disturbances (Schelhaus et al., 2003), at least in 
northern, western and central areas. In western and central European temperate forests higher 
temperatures would lead to an increasing dominance of deciduous broad-leaved species over 
coniferous species, but summer droughts could threaten some forests. Changes in the forests 
of southern Europe would be more affected by changes in water availability than temperature 
(Parry, 2000). Increased timber productivity in northern Europe could mean a reduction in the 
import of timber products from Russia and eastern Europe (Solberg et al., 2003). 
 
Accelerated climate change will increase these trends, with the difference between the rate of 
change in climatic suitability and the rate of migration even greater than with gradual climate 
change. It will also increase the risk of both summer drought and fire. Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
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Figure 11:  Change in crop suitability by 2020 and 2050, under A2 emissions, 
thermohaline circulation collapse in 2015, and accelerated climate change Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
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Thermohaline circulation collapse would reduce forest growth and timber yield, and be 
particularly challenging to broadleaved species at their northern or altitudinal limits. “Exotic” 
non-hardy species, such as sweet chestnut and eucalyptus, will be most threatened. Lower 
temperatures would increase the risk of many damaging fungi, but lower the risk posed by 
insect pests. 
 
5.5.4 Fisheries 
 
The diversity and productivity of marine fisheries around Europe is a function not only of 
ocean and climatic conditions, but also of the past history of overfishing. Empirical evidence 
from past climatic anomalies (spanning single years or decades) shows that marine fisheries 
populations are sensitive to climatic variability and hence potentially sensitive to future 
change. The warming in the North Sea between 1920 and 1940, for example, led to a 
northward expansion of cod. However, it can be very difficult to separate out effects of sea 
surface temperatures and effects of change in ocean circulation, which may themselves be a 
result of changes in sea surface temperatures elsewhere. Also, empirical evidence shows that 
different populations of the same species can respond differently to the same environmental 
forcing (Genner et al., 2004). Simulation of the response of marine fish populations to future 
climate change is therefore difficult, and has been rarely attempted (see Clark et al. (2003) 
for an example).  
 
There is virtually no information on potential changes in groundfish fisheries, and most 
evidence relates to North Sea cod. This is at its southerly limit in the North Sea (Parry, 2000), 
and simulation studies with a simple model suggest higher temperatures would lead to a 
northward movement in the cod fishery (Clark et al., 2003). Accelerated change would 
therefore be likely to result in the elimination of cod from the North Sea, whilst thermohaline 
circulation collapse could see expansion into the English Channel. However, precise changes 
in cod fisheries will depend also on changes in ocean circulation. Higher water temperatures 
are already being blamed for an observed decline in salmon abundance in northern Europe: 
evidence from physiological studies suggests that warmer temperatures would lead to a 
northward move in the geographic distribution of Atlantic salmon in Europe, with extinction 
at the southerly edge of the current range (McCarthy & Houlihan, 1997). The sardine fishery 
is economically important off the Iberian peninsula, and emprical evidence shows that 
sardine abundance is related to the intensity of upwelling in the previous summer (Guisande 
et al., 2004). Global warming is likely to increase the intensity of upwelling, and whilst this 
may benefit sardines, has the potential to significantly degrade marine ecosystems generally 
(Bakun & Weeks, 2004).  
 
Freshwater fisheries are commercially much less important in Europe than marine fisheries, 
but are extremely important not only for biodiversity reasons but also for recreation. 
Freshwater fisheries are affected not only by climatic variability and change but also by 
changes in water quality and the volume and timing of river flows. Species close to their 
current thermal limits (such as the Arctic Charr in English and Scottish lakes) are obviously 
most affected by climate change, and the impacts on population numbers will depend on 
ability to migrate. Rapid changes in climatic conditions, particularly water temperature, are 
therefore likely to have the greatest effect on small lakes, rivers and isolated water bodies 
(Parry, 2000). Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
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5.6  Biodiversity and its management 
 
Biodiversity in Europe is challenged not only by climate change, but also by other pressures 
including land cover change and pollution. To a large extent the effects of climate change 
will be dependent on how these other pressures change too in the future. 
 
Climate change affects different plant and animal species differently, and therefore has the 
potential to affect species composition and biodiversity in a given area. The more specialised 
the species, the more vulnerable it is to change (Julliard et al., 2004), and the more important 
these species are to a particular location the more sensitive biodiversity at that site is to 
climate change. Biodiversity in Europe will also be affected by climate changes elsewhere, as 
these may affect migrant species: changes in the Arctic are likely to be particularly important 
for European bird populations, for example. 
 
“Natural” biodiversity in Europe is largely maintained through nature reserves, typically 
covering a specified ecological niche. Climate change affects the viability of these reserves 
by changing climatic conditions. Reserves at greatest risk of change are those in marginal 
climate zones, such as alpine areas. 
 
Whilst there has been a great deal of research into the sensitivity of species and ecosystems to 
climatic variability, there has been less into how future climate change may affect ecosystems 
and biodiversity. Leemans & Eickhout (2004) simulated the distribution of major plant types 
(e.g. evergreen coniferous trees, drought deciduous trees, and so on) and ecosystems 
composed of these plant types across the globe with different rates of climate change. They 
showed that with temperature increases between 1 and 2
oC above pre-industrial levels (0.25-
1.25
oC above the 1961-1990 mean), most species, ecosystems and hence landscapes would 
be impacted. In the most general terms, global warming leads to a poleward or upward shift 
in many ecosystems. Boreal forest replace large parts of the southern edges of the tundra, and 
temperate forests replace boreal forest. Bakkenes et al.’s (2002) simulations in Europe (using 
empirical relationships between climate and species distribution) showed that, under gradual 
climate change, approximately a third of the plant species present in an grid cell in 1990 
would disappear from that cell by 2050: across approximately 40% of Europe, more than 
50% of the species present in 2050 would be different from those present in 1990. Thomas et 
al. (2004), using a similar approach, examined risk of extinction. With mid-range warming, 
they estimated that between 3 and 16% of plant species in Europe would become extinct, 
depending on assumed rates of dispersal. Taken together, these studies suggest that even 
where there is relatively little change in ecosystem or major plant type, there may be much 
larger changes in the abundance of individual species. 
 
At a more local scale, Lasch et al. (2002) simulated changes in forest characteristics in a part 
of Germany under climate change, showing a decrease in species diversity (numbers of 
different tree species) despite an increase in habitat diversity, due to a mismatch between the 
rate of climate change and the rate at which species can adjust to changed climates. A study 
of potential changes in species composition in nature reserves in the UK (Dockerty et al., 
2003) showed that biodiversity would be little affected in most UK reserves, but that key 
species in some important “climatically-marginal” reserves would be affected. Lemoine & 
Bohning-Goese, 2003) estimated that higher temperatures would lead to a reduction in bird Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
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migration to northern Europe, as warmer conditions would increase competition from 
resident species. 
 
Accelerated climate change would increase these tendencies still further, leading to even 
larger changes in local biodiversity and reductions in the viability of nature reserves (note 
that Leemans & Eickhout (2004) only considered temperature increases up to 3
oC by the end 
of the 21
st century). Palaeoecological evidence shows large and rapid changes in vegetation 
composition in response to earlier cooling events. Cooling after the 8.2ka event, for example, 
led to rapid increases in pine, birch and fir across northern Europe at the expense of less cold-
tolerant broad-leaved species such as hazel (Tinner & Lotter, 2001; Williams et al., 2002). 
Higgins & Vellinga (2004) simulated the effects of thermohaline circulation collapse (with no 
global warming) on ecosystem type and productivity, showing changes not just around the 
North Atlantic region. The distribution of ecosystem change was found to be largely 
determined by changes in rainfall, rather than  temperature. In Europe lower precipitation and 
temperatures produced a shift from temperate deciduous forest to boreal evergreen forest. 
 
Rapid sea level rises poses a serious threat to coastal ecosystems, including wetlands and 
tidal flats. “Coastal squeeze” prevents many of these habitats from moving inland as sea level 
rises. Large areas of wetland around the Mediterranean and the Baltic are at risk from sea 
level rise (Nicholls et al., 1999; Nicholls, 2004), and rapid sea level rise would effectively 
eliminate them. 
 
 
5.7  Settlements and infrastructure 
 
5.7.1  The urban environment 
 
The design and construction styles of buildings in European cities and towns, and to a lesser 
extent the layout of the urban environment itself, are influenced by climate regime. Buildings 
in northern areas are designed for cold winters, whilst buildings in southern Europe are 
designed to keep cool during hot summers. Climate change will affect the “performance” of 
the building fabric in European cities, in terms of thermal comfort, use of energy for heating 
and/or cooling and risk of damage during extreme wind or rain events (Liso et al., 2003). 
 
There has been very little research into building performance under changed climatic 
conditions (but see Camilleri et al., 2001). Levermore et al. (2000;2004) simulated 
performance of a typical naturally-ventilated office in southern England, showing that the 
percentage of time indoor temperatures exceeded 25
oC more than doubled to 7-8% with a 
temperature rise of 2
oC, and increased by between 5 and 6 times to 15-18% with a rise of 
5
oC, with the increase depending on construction type. Current design standards in the UK 
require temperatures to be above 25
oC for less than 5% of occupied time. Higher 
temperatures, then, can be expected to lead to increased discomfort in buildings, with the 
greatest effect likely in areas not accustomed to hot summers. The effects of a reduction in 
temperature will be felt through increases in the duration of “unacceptably” low temperatures 
during winter and increased energy expenditure on heating (Section 5.3). 
 
Many European cities have large stocks of old and historically significant buildings. The 
structural integrity and performance of these buildings are likely to be significantly impacted 
by a changing climate, and they will be particularly difficult to alter. Rather more 
speculatively, urban design and the use of open spaces would change as climate changed. Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
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Climate change also changes the risk of damage to buildings in the urban environment from 
extreme weather events, such as wind and ice storms (flooding is discussed in Section 5.2). 
Across much of Europe such damage is covered by insurance: whilst a reduced risk of 
damage would lessen burdens on the insurance industry, and increase in risk could seriously 
challenge the ability of the insurance market to continue to provide cover. There is, however, 
little information on potential changes in extreme windspeeds or ice loadings under climate 
change. There are some indications that whilst the frequency of wind storm events across the 
UK would not change under gradual climate change, the maximum gust intensity and hence 
risk of damage could increase (Hanson et al., 2004). Accelerated climate change could 
increase further windstorm intensity across Europe. Thermohaline circulation collapse could 
increase the frequency of extreme ice and snow loading in western Europe. 
 
 
5.7.2  Transportation networks and infrastructure 
 
Transport networks are clearly sensitive to climatic variability, and any change in the 
frequency of disruptive events (including high winds, icings and fog) would obviously affect 
the reliability of a transport network. More significantly, however, such a change would 
affect maintenance expenditure and may alter the physical reliability of transport 
infrastructure. 
 
In northern Europe the main maintenance expenditure is on de-icing for roads, railways and 
runways, and unanticipated freezing events tend to be the events causing the greatest 
disruption. This is particularly the case where temperatures during winter can fluctuate 
around 0
oC. With higher temperatures this marginal temperature zone will move eastwards 
into Europe, shifting the disruption potential from the UK and France eastwards into 
Germany (Parry, 2000), although because these areas are used to low temperatures, impacts 
may be relatively small. With lower temperatures, the risk of disruption increases 
significantly in milder western Europe – areas with less experience of dealing with low 
temperatures. 
 
The physical infrastructure associated with transport networks is designed to cope with 
current climatic variability, and standards therefore vary across Europe. Roads and railways 
in northern countries are designed to cope with low temperatures, for example, whilst in 
southern Europe they are designed for high summer temperatures. Drainage design is based 
on local rainfall characteristics.  
 
Port infrastructure is particularly sensitive to changes in sea level, as much is by necessity 
close to sea level. Accessibility may also be affected by changes in offshore sediment 
transport, themselves affected partly by sea level rise and partly by changes in storm 
characteristics. Higher temperatures would increase the ice-free season for ports in northern 
Europe – such as those on the shores of the Baltic – and increase the potential for sea 
transport. Conversely, lower temperatures would increase ice cover and perhaps close British 
ports to winter shipping: this would severely disrupt trade. 
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5.8  Economic implications of the impacts of climate change 
 
The impacts of climate change on water, energy, health, agriculture, biodiversity and 
settlements will alter the pattern of economic activity within a region and change the 
distribution of activities across Europe. In particular, changes to resource-based sectors – 
agriculture, fisheries, forestry and tourism – will affect the pattern of economic activity under 
most scenarios. Under the extreme climate change scenarios the changes in climate may be 
sufficient to challenge the viability of activities that are currently not seen as climate-
sensitive.  
 
Gradual climate change in Europe is likely to exaggerate the economic gradient between 
northern and southern Europe. The centre of gravity of agricultural production would move 
northwards, and tourism would be oriented towards the north rather than the south and 
around the Mediterranean. Accelerated climate change would exaggerate these trends even 
more, and may also threaten the economic viability of industry in parts of southern and 
eastern Europe which become particularly warm. Air conditioning or cooling costs, for 
example, may make indoor factory work prohibitively expensive. Thermohaline circulation 
collapse, however, would result in a shift southwards in the economic centre of gravity of 
Europe, as agriculture and industry moves south to escape the colder and less disruptive 
winter conditions. Again, increases in space heating costs and disruption to transport 
networks during winter may make some industrial activities in northern and western Europe 
uneconomic. Rapid sea level rise would threaten a number of the most economically 
important cities in Europe, including London, Hamburg and Amsterdam, leading to a shift 
inland. Each of these changes would affect power relations within the European Union in 
different ways, but exactly how these effects are manifest is very difficult to judge. 
 
 
5.9  Security, population movements and conflict 
 
Stories in the media frequently raise the possibility that climate change would lead to major 
political disruption and conflict, either between states or following the breakdown of social 
order. Indeed, fictional representations of climate change (e.g. The Day After Tomorrow and 
Christopher’s The World In Winter) tend to be based on this premise. Archaeological and 
historical evidence (e.g. Fagan, 2004; van Geel et al., 1996) shows that past abrupt climate 
changes have led to major population movements and societal collapse. 
 
However, there has been very little academic work on the link between future climate change 
and conflict (Barnett, 2003). The only published study is that of Edwards (1999), who 
explored the security implications of sea level rise inundating several island states in the 
south west Pacific. He showed that climate change, in this case leading to loss of inhabitable 
area, had the potential to exacerbate existing issues associated with economic, social, political 
and military security. 
 
Climate change will also impact differentially within a society, and the more extreme the 
climate change the greater the differentiation. A robust conclusion from hazard research is 
that ability to recover from loss and adapt to change is strongly dependent on wealth. The 
poorest in society are least able to relocate or be able to afford increased cooling or heating 
costs, for example. 
 Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
 50  February  2005 
Europe may also be affected by climate change elsewhere in the world. The threat of 
environmental refugees driven towards Europe by deteriorating conditions in Africa 
particularly has been discussed in the media, but there are no academic studies of the 
potential for this to occur. Similarly, climate change may exacerbate resource conflicts (e.g. 
over oil) that affect European and American interests. 
 
 
5.10  Overview: estimating the impacts of abrupt climate change 
 
This review has been very speculative, and is based on no published studies of the 
implications of abrupt climate change: the calculations undertaken specifically for this study 
must be seen as indicative only. Moreover, there have actually been very few comprehensive 
assessments of the implications of gradual climate change in Europe. Virtually all 
quantitative studies have so far concentrated on particular sectors and regions, and many 
sectors – such as transportation – have not been studied at all. Most studies have focused on 
biophysical impacts of climate change, rather than social and economic consequences. There 
are, however, a number of ongoing projects, such as cCASHh (www.who.dk/ccashh) looking 
at health implications and ATEAM examining ecosystem services (www.pik-
potsdam.de/ateam), although these are not looking at scenarios of abrupt climate change. 
 
It is, in fact, rather dangerous to seek to extrapolate from studies of gradual climate change in 
order to assess the implications of abrupt climate change. The translation of climate change 
into social and economic impact is characterised by the presence of both physical and human 
critical thresholds, and the greater the rate of climate change the greater the likelihood that a 
threshold is reached. Unfortunately, these thresholds vary with location and the current and 
future state of economy and society. 
 
Lessons from the past are of value in assessing the biophysical effects of abrupt climate 
change, but are of limited use in assessing social and economic impacts because impacts of 
are so dependent on economic and social conditions. 
 
 
6.  Vulnerability in Europe to abrupt climate change 
 
Vulnerability, as defined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2001), depends 
not only on the magnitude of impact or sensitivity to change, but also on the ability to adapt 
to change (“adaptive capacity”). The previous section has considered in qualitative terms the 
potential magnitude of the impact of abrupt climate change in Europe, but assessing 
vulnerability to abrupt climate change is extremely problematic, for two reasons. First, it is 
difficult to characterise capacity to adapt to abrupt climate change, and second assessments of 
vulnerability must be based on assessments of risk of occurrence. 
 
One hypothesis would be that capacity to adapt to abrupt climate change is related to the 
capacity to adapt to conventional climate change. Several studies have explored the factors 
which potentially affect the variability in adaptive capacity between regions or countries, and 
hence vulnerability. Intuitively, regional or national wealth is a major driver of vulnerability 
and ability to respond to events, but Brooks et al. (2005) suggest that variability in adaptive 
capacity varies with measures associated with governance and access to resources, rather than 
simply the gross wealth of a nation. Klein et al. (pers comm.) attempted to characterise the 
variability of adaptive capacity across Europe using indicators of wealth, governance, and Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe 
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other social measures, suggesting lower adaptive capacity in southern Europe. Under this 
hypothesis, the poorer parts of Europe – in the south and east – would be most vulnerable to 
abrupt climate change, not because the changes are greater but because ability to cope is 
lower than further west. 
 
A second hypothesis would be that the implications of abrupt climate change are so large that 
ability to cope with relatively small changes becomes irrelevant. In this case, vulnerability 
would therefore largely be function of the potential impacts of climate change, which are (as 
indicated in Section 5) likely to be greatest in western and southern Europe. 
 
It is, of course, extremely difficult to evaluate these two hypotheses, primarily because it is 
actually very difficult to derive an index of capacity to adapt to conventional or, even more 
problematically, abrupt climate change. Brooks et al.’s (2005) index of capacity to adapt to 
conventional climate change is calibrated on numbers of people affected by climate-related 
natural disasters, which is arguably an unrealistic proxy for adaptability to climate change. 
One approach would be to conduct an expert elicitation survey amongst experts experienced 
in assessing vulnerability to change. 
 
The second difficulty with conducting a vulnerability assessment relates to the actual or 
perceived likelihood of the event occurring. As noted above, it is widely accepted that 
conventional climate change is occurring, and to a large extent the scientific uncertainty 
revolves around the precise rate of change and exactly what would happen with a given rate 
of change. Abrupt climate change is, largely, characterised as some form of step change 
which has a discrete, but unknown probability of occurrence. Perceptions of vulnerability are 
therefore based not on magnitude of change, but on likelihood of the step change. If this 
likelihood is believed to be “too low”, then Europe will not be perceived to be vulnerable to 
abrupt climate change. This threshold will vary from sector to sector and, probably, region to 
region, and contrasts with thresholds of danger from other step changes – such as asteroid 
impact – would be illuminating. Unfortunately, as also noted above, estimates of the 
likelihood of abrupt climate change are uncertain and contested. 
 
 
7.  Implications for adaptation strategies 
 
7.1  Introduction: adaptation to climate change 
 
Adaptation can be broadly defined as an adjustment in ecological, social or economic systems 
in response to observed or expected changes in climatic stimuli and their effects and impacts.  
Adaptation involves changes in processes, practices and structures to moderate potential 
damages or to benefit from new opportunities. 
 
Two basic approaches to adaptation to climate change are emerging. The first is scenario 
driven, and essentially includes the following stages: 
  - identify exposure to climate change 
  - identify impacts under a range of change scenarios 
  - determine adaptation strategy 
  - identify and evaluate adaptation options 
  - select an adaptation option 
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Given that there is a large degree of uncertainty, the “ideal” adaptation option is one that is 
robust to uncertainty or sufficiently flexible to be able to cope with different futures.  
 
The other approach derives from the development agenda, and seeks to adapt to climate 
change by reducing vulnerability to current and future climatic extremes. This approach is 
less concerned with the development and use of climate change scenarios, and focuses more 
on the characteristics of economic and social systems that are exposed to change. However, 
in practice climate change scenarios must provide some limiting conditions. 
 
Virtually all research into adaptation to future climate change has focused on “conventional” 
gradual climate change, although even here there is considerable evidence that the rates of 
change will be too rapid for efficient adaptation: many of the large infrastructure investments 
potentially sensitive to climate change have lead times of several decades. The threat of 
abrupt climate change challenges the scenario-driven approach by introducing additional, 
more extreme, climate and impact scenarios, and in a similar way expands the potential 
boundary conditions in the vulnerability-based approach. It challenges both approaches by 
affecting the feasibility of adaptation options. 
 
Managers considering adaptation are already used to the concept of a changing climate and, 
in the UK at least, have access to a set of scenarios describing a range of possible futures. 
Whilst there is some discussion about the likelihood of different rates of change (see for 
example Dessai & Hulme, 2004;  Schneider, 2001; 2002), in practice organisations in the UK 
seeking to adapt are likely to be content – at the strategic level – with exploring the 
implications of a finite set of  “reasonable” climate change scenarios. Indeed, this is 
increasingly becoming standard business practice in general. Scenarios of abrupt change, 
however, have a highly uncertain, but probably very low (but see Section 4.2), likelihood of 
realisation. They will only be taken seriously in strategic scenario-based adaptation planning 
if their perceived likelihood is sufficiently high, but the definition of “sufficiently high” will 
vary between organisations. It can be hypothesised that the threshold will be a function of the 
potential consequences of abrupt climate change for the organisation, the ability of the 
organisation to adapt to changing conditions (itself a function of technical considerations and 
organisational capacity: see next section), and organisational risk aversion. 
 
The second key implication of abrupt climate change is for the feasibility of adaptation 
options. In the most general terms, there are four limits to adaptation: physical, financial, 
social and political, and those relating to organisational capacity. The physical limits are 
likely to be the broadest, given that human societies have already adapted to an extremely 
wide range of climates and there is thus, in principle, a wide range of experience (although 
this may be outside existing organisational experience or awareness). The other three limits 
will be more challenging. Whilst a particular response may be technically feasible – adapting 
UK housing standards to those found in continental Russia, for example, under a scenario of 
thermohaline circulation collapse – it may be extremely difficult and costly to implement in 
practice, even for new developments. It is likely, however, that many of the current social and 
political constraints on adaptation options would change in the face of an abrupt climate 
change. It is quite possible that concerns for the physical environment would reduce as 
climate change becomes more extreme: it would, for example, be increasingly difficult for 
water managers to justify maintaining river flows for environmental reasons when farmers, 
households and industry are seriously affected by shortage. Finally, the threat of abrupt 
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organisational capabilities of an organisation exposed to climate change, even one aware of 
and responding to gradual climate change.  
 
Central to the vulnerability-oriented approach to adaptation is the idea that adapting better to 
current climatic variability would go a long way towards adapting to future climate change. 
Whilst some measures to adapt to current variability would also cope with changing 
circumstances (Adger et al., 2005), many would not: their performance is based on providing 
some defined standard of service, which would obviously change as climate changes. Abrupt 
climate change, by definition, involves a step change in climate in an area, and measures 
designed to cope with current climatic variability are therefore even less likely to be a 
reasonable response to abrupt climate change. 
 
Abrupt climate change, therefore, affects the potential range of climate impacts and the 
feasibility of adaptation options, but given the (uncertain) low probability of abrupt change 
and uncertainty over its direction (cooling or rapid warming?) it is difficult to see how 
organisations can plan now to adapt to abrupt climate change. However, whilst it may not be 
necessary for organisations to prepare for abrupt climate change, it is extremely important to 
monitor for the onset of abrupt climate change. Despite the impression given in The Day 
After Tomorrow, an abrupt climate change would probably take place over at least a decade 
(Vellinga & Wood’s (2002) simulation showed that it took a decade for the thermohaline 
circulation to completely switch off after a large input of freshwater and up to 20 years for 
the development of persistent reductions in temperature across the Northern Hemisphere). 
Whilst this is very short in terms of many adaptation options, it is highly likely that 
awareness of impending dramatic change would focus the mind. Monitoring for the onset of 
abrupt climate change is therefore the most appropriate short-term adaptive action. 
 
7.2  The adaptation process 
 
Figure 12 below presents a simple three-stage conceptual model of the process of adopting an 
adaptation to climate change. Each stage – awareness, intention and action – is influenced by 
the internal characteristics of the adapting organisation, sensitivity to change and external 
drivers, although different aspects of these influences are relevant at each stage. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12:  The adaptation process: the dashed lines show weaker connections 
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The first stage is the awareness of the potential threat. This is determined by access to 
information on climate change, experience of past extreme events or changing conditions, 
and the sensitivity of the activity to climate change. The first two factors are essentially 
internal characteristics of the organisation, and are in turn dependent on organisational 
culture, the extent to which the organisation is internally- or externally-oriented, and 
organisational history. Information on climate change may be provided by the government or 
media, but its effect on awareness will be mediated by organisational characteristics, so the 
link between external influences and awareness is shown as a dashed line in Figure 12. 
 
Sensitivity to change affects not only awareness, but also the development of an intention to 
adapt: in the simplest terms, the greater the potential impact of climate change, the greater the 
likely intention to adapt. Organisational characteristics that affect the intention to adapt 
include perception of the significance of the threat, degree of risk aversion and the ability to 
identify opportunities through adaptation. External influences include directives from 
government or regulators and economic signals from the market. 
 
The translation of an intention into an action is primarily determined by organisational 
characteristics – primarily wealth or ability to mobilise resources – and by external drivers. 
These drivers may require action to be taken, through the issuance of new regulations, for 
example, but may make it more difficult to translate intention into action. For example, legal 
or regulatory constraints may preclude some adaptation actions. 
 
Empirical evidence from the UK water industry suggests that the ability of different water 
supply companies to adapt to “gradual” climate change is largely determined by geographical 
variations in the susceptibility to climate change across the UK: each company is subject to 
the same regulatory constraints, and the resources, capabilities and objectives of each supply 
company are broadly similar (Arnell & Delaney, 2005). The ability of house-building 
companies to adapt, however, is much more determined by the characteristics of the company 
(Berkhout et al., 2003). 
 
The ability to adapt to abrupt climate change will be affected by the same three sets of 
influences, but their relative importance will be different. First, it is likely that the 
susceptibility to climate change will become much more important, even in those sectors 
where susceptibility is already the key determinant of adaptive capacity. In most cases, 
gradual climate change does not produce radically or conceptually different climatic 
conditions. Whilst adaptation may be challenging, it is relatively straightforward to learn 
from either past extreme events or other geographic environments. Abrupt climate change 
brings quite different and much more challenging climatic conditions. Second, it is likely that 
the role of government will be much more significant – regardless of future development 
pathways – in the face of abrupt climate change. Fictional accounts of rapid climate change 
(e.g. The Day After Tomorrow and John Christopher’s 1963 novel The World in Winter) tend 
to portray the breakdown of government authority, but these usually assume a very rapid 
climatic breakdown. In the face of an inevitable, but slightly slower-onset, abrupt climate 
change it is more likely that government authority and degree of attempted control over 
climate-sensitive sectors would increase. 
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8.  Conclusions and further research 
 
8.1  Summary of conclusions 
 
The aim of this project was to explore the implications of rapid or abrupt climate changes – 
defined here to be either a step change in climate regime or a rate of change outside the IPCC 
range – for Europe. Whilst there has been a great deal of research into the potential 
mechanisms of abrupt climate change, but there are no published quantitative scenarios on 
which to base assessments of impacts or vulnerability. Three characterisations of abrupt 
climate change were therefore produced for the current study, representing a collapse of the 
thermohaline circulation in the North Atlantic, accelerated climate change caused by the 
additional release of greenhouse gases, and the rapid rise in sea level that would result from 
disintegration of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet. 
 
Managers adapting to gradual climate change accept that change is happening, and look for 
information on the magnitude of change. Managers concerned about abrupt climate change, 
however, are less interested in the magnitude of change – they believe it will by definition be 
extreme – but are more interested in the likelihood of abrupt change occurring. There are as 
yet no scientifically robust estimates of such likelihoods, so an expert survey was conducted 
focusing on assessments of the likelihood of thermohaline circulation collapse and 
accelerated climate change. Estimates of the likelihood of thermohaline circulation collapse 
or accelerated climate change varied significantly between experts, over several orders of 
magnitude: most experts believed the risk of either to be very low (well under 1%), but a 
minority assessed the risk as considerably greater. 
 
An initial assessment of the implications of the three characterisations of abrupt climate 
change was made using a combination of model simulations (for hydrology and crop 
potential), review of published studies of the effects of gradual climate change and change 
thresholds, and expert judgement. 
 
The key impacts of both thermohaline circulation collapse and accelerated climate change are 
likely to be on agriculture and crop production (and hence crop prices and rural economies), 
mortality and ill health, the ability of physical infrastructure (buildings and networks) to 
continue to operate effectively, and on ecosystems in both northern and southern Eirope. 
Accelerated climate change is also likely to significantly affect the availability of water 
resources as demand increases and supplies reduce. Rapid sea level rise would threaten 
coastal infrastructure and large parts of many key European cities, and would increase coastal 
flood losses: this would challenge the viability of insurance against flood hazards, and require 
very large investment in flood defences. All three abrupt changes would see a change in the 
economic and cultural centre of gravity of Europe, in different directions: following 
thermohaline circulation collapse the shift would be southwards, following accelerated 
change it would be northwards, and it would be inland after rapid sea level rise. 
 
Abrupt climate change influences adaptation strategies by affecting the potential range of 
climate impacts and the feasibility of adaptation options, but given the (uncertain) low 
probability of abrupt change and uncertainty over its direction (cooling or rapid warming?) it 
is difficult to see how organisations can plan now to adapt to abrupt climate change. 
However, it is extremely important that measures are implemented to monitor for the onset of 
abrupt climate change.  
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Several recent papers have suggested that analogues from the past can provide useful 
information about the vulnerability of economies and societies to abrupt climate change (e.g. 
Fagan, 2004; van Geel et al., 1996). However, in each case the societies that were impacted 
and adapted are quite different to those of the 21
st century: they were largely agrarian, 
frequently governed by despots and not part of a globalising economy. 
 
 
8.2 Future  research 
 
This study has shown that whilst there has been considerable research into the potential 
mechanisms of abrupt climate change, there has been much less research into their potential 
impacts or possible responses. 
 
Key areas for future research include: 
 
•  Quantitative characterisations of abrupt changes in climate: scenarios that can be used 
to drive quantitative impacts models need to be constructed using current 
ocean/climate models. In particular, scenarios combining thermohaline circulation 
collapse with an increasing concentration of greenhouse gases need to be constructed, 
and model simulations of accelerated climate change are required. The 
characterisations used in this preliminary assessment were necessarily based on rather 
naïve assumptions. 
•  Quantitative characterisations of the likelihood of defined abrupt changes in climate, 
under different assumed rates of climate change. This is extremely important, and 
should involve not only model simulations but also assessment of expert opinion (a 
major in-depth survey is currently being conducted by the Potsdam Institute for 
Climate Impact Research). 
•  Quantitative assessments of the implications of abrupt climate changes for defined 
sectors and regions: the only model-based assessments so far conducted were done for 
the current study and concentrated on physical impacts. In principle this is a relatively 
straightforward task, given scenarios for abrupt climate change and models of 
impacted sectors.  
•  Identification of “dangerous” magnitudes of climate change which would pose 
significant challenges to adaptation (see Dessai et al., 2004): in other words, what are 
the limits to adaptation? These will vary between sectors. 
•  Assessment of the vulnerability of different regions of Europe to abrupt climate 
change, in contrast to vulnerability to “conventional” climate change, based on expert 
elicitation. 
•  What are the specific implications of abrupt climate change for adaptation planning in 
particular sectors? Is it possible to draw analogies from other areas exposed to low-
probability, high-impact events, such as military scenario planning or nuclear power 
station design? 
•  What probability of abrupt climate change would alter adaptation planning, and what 
factors influence this threshold probability?  
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